[PATCH] seccomp: fix populating a0-a5 syscall args in 32-bit x86 BPF

[Daniel Borkmann]

Linus reports that on 32-bit x86 Chromium throws the following seccomp
resp. audit log messages:

  audit: type=1326 audit(1397359304.356:28108): auid=500 uid=500
gid=500 ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:chrome_sandbox_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
pid=3677 comm="chrome" exe="/opt/google/chrome/chrome" sig=0
syscall=172 compat=0 ip=0xb2dd9852 code=0x30000

  audit: type=1326 audit(1397359304.356:28109): auid=500 uid=500
gid=500 ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:chrome_sandbox_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
pid=3677 comm="chrome" exe="/opt/google/chrome/chrome" sig=0 syscall=5
compat=0 ip=0xb2dd9852 code=0x50000

These audit messages are being triggered via audit_seccomp() through
__secure_computing() in seccomp mode (BPF) filter with seccomp return
codes 0x30000 (== SECCOMP_RET_TRAP) and 0x50000 (== SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO)
during filter runtime. Moreover, Linus reports that x86_64 Chromium
seems fine.

The underlying issue that explains this is that the implementation of
populate_seccomp_data() is wrong. Our seccomp data structure sd that
is being shared with user ABI is:

  struct seccomp_data {
    int nr;
    __u32 arch;
    __u64 instruction_pointer;
    __u64 args[6];
  };

Therefore, a simple cast to 'unsigned long *' for storing the value of
the syscall argument via syscall_get_arguments() is just wrong as on
32-bit x86 (or any other 32bit arch), it would result in storing a0-a5
at wrong offsets in args[] member, and thus i) could leak stack memory
to user space and ii) tampers with the logic of seccomp BPF programs
that read out and check for syscall arguments:

  syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[0]);

Tested on 32-bit x86 with Google Chrome, unfortunately only via remote
test machine through slow ssh X forwarding, but it fixes the issue on
my side. So fix it up by storing args in type correct variables, gcc
is clever and optimizes the copy away in other cases, e.g. x86_64.

Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set")
Reported-and-bisected-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Dave, do you want to pick this up?

 kernel/seccomp.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index d8d046c..590c379 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -69,18 +69,17 @@ static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task = current;
 	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
+	unsigned long args[6];
 
 	sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
 	sd->arch = syscall_get_arch();
-
-	/* Unroll syscall_get_args to help gcc on arm. */
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[0]);
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 1, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[1]);
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 2, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[2]);
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 3, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[3]);
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 4, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[4]);
-	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 5, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[5]);
-
+	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 6, args);
+	sd->args[0] = args[0];
+	sd->args[1] = args[1];
+	sd->args[2] = args[2];
+	sd->args[3] = args[3];
+	sd->args[4] = args[4];
+	sd->args[5] = args[5];
 	sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
 }
 
-- 
1.7.11.7

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