Re: For review: user_namespace(7) man page
From: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
Date: Mon Sep 01 2014 - 13:31:52 EST
On 08/30/2014 11:53 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> Hello Eric et al.,
>> For various reasons, my work on the namespaces man pages
>> fell off the table a while back. Nevertheless, the pages have
>> been close to completion for a while now, and I recently restarted,
>> in an effort to finish them. As you also noted to me f2f, there have
>> been recently been some small namespace changes that you may affect
>> the content of the pages. Therefore, I'll take the opportunity to
>> send the namespace-related pages out for further (final?) review.
>> So, here, I start with the user_namespaces(7) page, which is shown
>> in rendered form below, with source attached to this mail. I'll
>> send various other pages in follow-on mails.
>> Review comments/suggestions for improvements / bug fixes welcome.
>> user_namespaces - overview of Linux user_namespaces
>> For an overview of namespaces, see namespaces(7).
>> User namespaces isolate security-related identifiers and
>> attributes, in particular, user IDs and group IDs (see credenâ
>> tials(7), the root directory, keys (see keyctl(2)), and capabiliâ
>> ties (see capabilities(7)). A process's user and group IDs can
>> be different inside and outside a user namespace. In particular,
>> a process can have a normal unprivileged user ID outside a user
>> namespace while at the same time having a user ID of 0 inside the
>> namespace; in other words, the process has full privileges for
>> operations inside the user namespace, but is unprivileged for
>> operations outside the namespace.
>> Nested namespaces, namespace membership
>> User namespaces can be nested; that is, each user namespaceâ
>> except the initial ("root") namespaceâhas a parent user namesâ
>> pace, and can have zero or more child user namespaces. The parâ
>> ent user namespace is the user namespace of the process that creâ
>> ates the user namespace via a call to unshare(2) or clone(2) with
>> the CLONE_NEWUSER flag.
>> The kernel imposes (since version 3.11) a limit of 32 nested levâ
>> els of user namespaces. Calls to unshare(2) or clone(2) that
>> would cause this limit to be exceeded fail with the error EUSERS.
>> Each process is a member of exactly one user namespace. A
>> process created via fork(2) or clone(2) without the CLONE_NEWUSER
>> flag is a member of the same user namespace as its parent.
> ^ single-threaded
> Because of chroot and other things multi-threaded processes are not
> allowed to join a user namespace. For the documentation just saying
> single-threaded sounds like enough here.
>> process can join another user namespace with setns(2) if it has
>> the CAP_SYS_ADMIN in that namespace; upon doing so, it gains a
>> full set of capabilities in that namespace.
>> A call to clone(2) or unshare(2) with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag
>> makes the new child process (for clone(2)) or the caller (for
>> unshare(2)) a member of the new user namespace created by the
>> The child process created by clone(2) with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag
>> starts out with a complete set of capabilities in the new user
>> namespace. Likewise, a process that creates a new user namespace
>> using unshare(2) or joins an existing user namespace using
>> setns(2) gains a full set of capabilities in that namespace. On
>> the other hand, that process has no capabilities in the parent
>> (in the case of clone(2)) or previous (in the case of unshare(2)
>> and setns(2)) user namespace, even if the new namespace is creâ
>> ated or joined by the root user (i.e., a process with user ID 0
>> in the root namespace).
>> Note that a call to execve(2) will cause a process to lose any
>> capabilities that it has, unless it has a user ID of 0 within the
>> namespace. See the discussion of user and group ID mappings,
>> A call to clone(2), unshare(2), or setns(2) using the
>> CLONE_NEWUSER flag sets the "securebits" flags (see capabiliâ
>> ties(7)) to their default values (all flags disabled) in the
>> child (for clone(2)) or caller (for unshare(2), or setns(2)).
>> Note that because the caller no longer has capabilities in its
>> original user namespace after a call to setns(2), it is not posâ
>> sible for a process to reset its "securebits" flags while retainâ
>> ing its user namespace membership by using a pair of setns(2)
>> calls to move to another user namespace and then return to its
>> original user namespace.
>> Having a capability inside a user namespace permits a process to
>> perform operations (that require privilege) only on resources
>> governed by that namespace. The rules for determining whether or
>> not a process has a capability in a particular user namespace are
>> as follows:
>> 1. A process has a capability inside a user namespace if it is a
>> member of that namespace and it has the capability in its
>> effective capability set. A process can gain capabilities in
>> its effective capability set in various ways. For example, it
>> may execute a set-user-ID program or an executable with assoâ
>> ciated file capabilities. In addition, a process may gain
>> capabilities via the effect of clone(2), unshare(2), or
>> setns(2), as already described.
>> 2. If a process has a capability in a user namespace, then it has
>> that capability in all child (and further removed descendant)
>> namespaces as well.
>> 3. When a user namespace is created, the kernel records the
>> effective user ID of the creating process as being the "owner"
>> of the namespace. A process that resides in the parent of the
>> user namespace and whose effective user ID matches the owner
>> of the namespace has all capabilities in the namespace. By
>> virtue of the previous rule, this means that the process has
>> all capabilities in all further removed descendant user namesâ
>> paces as well.
>> Interaction of user namespaces and other types of namespaces
>> Starting in Linux 3.8, unprivileged processes can create user
>> namespaces, and mount, PID, IPC, network, and UTS namespaces can
>> be created with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the caller's
>> user namespace.
>> If CLONE_NEWUSER is specified along with other CLONE_NEW* flags
>> in a single clone(2) or unshare(2) call, the user namespace is
>> guaranteed to be created first, giving the child (clone(2)) or
>> caller (unshare(2)) privileges over the remaining namespaces creâ
>> ated by the call. Thus, it is possible for an unprivileged callâ
>> er to specify this combination of flags.
>> When a new IPC, mount, network, PID, or UTS namespace is created
>> via clone(2) or unshare(2), the kernel records the user namespace
>> of the creating process against the new namespace. (This associâ
>> ation can't be changed.) When a process in the new namespace
>> subsequently performs privileged operations that operate on
>> global resources isolated by the namespace, the permission checks
>> are performed according to the process's capabilities in the user
>> namespace that the kernel associated with the new namespace.
> Restrictions on mount namespaces.
> - A mount namespace has a owner user namespace. A mount namespace whose
> owner user namespace is different than the owerner user namespace of
> it's parent mount namespace is considered a less privileged mount
> - When creating a less privileged mount namespace shared mounts are
> reduced to slave mounts. This ensures that mappings performed in less
> privileged mount namespaces will not propogate to more privielged
> mount namespaces.
> - Mounts that come as a single unit from more privileged mount are
> locked together and may not be separated in a less privielged mount
> - The mount flags readonly, nodev, nosuid, noexec, and the mount atime
> settings when propogated from a more privielged to a less privileged
> mount namespace become locked, and may not be changed in the less
> privielged mount namespace.
> - (As of 3.18-rc1 (in todays Al Viros vfs.git#for-next tree)) A file or
> directory that is a mountpoint in one namespace that is not a mount
> point in another namespace, may be renamed, unlinked, or rmdired in
> the mount namespace in which it is not a mount namespace if the
> ordinary permission checks pass.
> Previously attemping to rmdir, unlink or rename a file or directory
> that was a mount point in another mount namespace would result in
> -EBUSY. This behavior had technical problems of enforcement (nfs)
> and resulted in a nice denial of servial attack against more
> privileged users. (Aka preventing individual files from being updated
> by bind mounting on top of them).
I need some help here. What is your intention for the above text.
Do you mean I should add it pretty much as is under a subheading
"Restrictions on mount namespaces"?
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