Re: [CFT][PATCH 3/8] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Tue Dec 09 2014 - 18:00:51 EST


On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:39 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
> compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
> established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.
>
> For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
> and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
> includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c
>
> Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
> of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
> setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
>
> For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
> with privilege this change will have no affect.
>

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

> This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 ----
> 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 27c8dab48c07..1ce6d67c07b7 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -821,10 +821,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
> if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
> return true;
> - } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
> - kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
> - if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
> - return true;
> }
> }
>
> --
> 1.9.1
>



--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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