[PATCH 3.14 38/52] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Jan 06 2015 - 21:13:58 EST


3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d upstream.

setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and
fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map
their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid,
as no new credentials can be obtained.

I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting
uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use
of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
- if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
return true;
}
}


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