[PATCH v3 15/17] crypto: talitos - SEC1 bugs on 0 data hash

From: Christophe Leroy
Date: Fri Apr 17 2015 - 10:32:34 EST


SEC1 bugs on 0 data hash, so we submit an already padded block representing 0 data

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@xxxxxx>
---
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index dddf4b3..f1406d7b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -1797,6 +1797,27 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev,
areq->base.complete(&areq->base, err);
}

+/*
+ * SEC1 doesn't like hashing of 0 sized message, so we do the padding
+ * ourself and submit a padded block
+ */
+void talitos_handle_buggy_hash(struct talitos_ctx *ctx,
+ struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
+ struct talitos_ptr *ptr)
+{
+ static u8 padded_hash[64] = {
+ 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ };
+
+ pr_err_once("Bug in SEC1, padding ourself\n");
+ edesc->desc.hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD;
+ map_single_talitos_ptr(ctx->dev, ptr, sizeof(padded_hash),
+ (char *)padded_hash, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+}
+
static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int length,
void (*callback) (struct device *dev,
@@ -1857,6 +1878,9 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
/* last DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[6] = zero_entry;

+ if (is_sec1 && from_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[3], true) == 0)
+ talitos_handle_buggy_hash(ctx, edesc, &desc->ptr[3]);
+
ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq);
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
--
2.1.0

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