Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing

[Seth Forshee]

On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 10:02:32PM +0200, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> This begs the question on how we'd manage keys for firmware signing on
> linux-firmare. Since the keys are x509 keys we need a CA. Based on some initial
> discussions it would seem we'd need the Linux Foundation to create a key, this
> would be embedded in the kernel and that key would be used to sign Kyle's key.
> Kyle would in turn use his key for signing linux-firmware files. David, Kyle,
> did I summarize this correctly ?

I raised the question of key revocation when we discussed this on irc,
but it wasn't answered to my satisfaction. If a key signed by the
kernel-embedded key is compromised, how can that key be revoked so that
it is no longer trusted?

Someone mentioned UEFI blacklists, which I don't know much about, but
not all systems have UEFI. The only reliable option that comes to mind
for me is an in-kernel blacklist of keys which should no longer be
trusted.

Seth
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