[PATCH 3.2 046/110] fs: Fix S_NOSEC handling

[Ben Hutchings]

3.2.71-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>

commit 2426f3910069ed47c0cc58559a6d088af7920201 upstream.

file_remove_suid() could mistakenly set S_NOSEC inode bit when root was
modifying the file. As a result following writes to the file by ordinary
user would avoid clearing suid or sgid bits.

Fix the bug by checking actual mode bits before setting S_NOSEC.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 mm/filemap.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/filemap.c
+++ b/mm/filemap.c
@@ -2007,8 +2007,8 @@ int file_remove_suid(struct file *file)
 		error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
 	if (!error && killsuid)
 		error = __remove_suid(dentry, killsuid);
-	if (!error && (inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NOSEC))
-		inode->i_flags |= S_NOSEC;
+	if (!error)
+		inode_has_no_xattr(inode);
 
 	return error;
 }

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