Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting
From: Eric W. Biederman
Date: Fri Sep 25 2015 - 13:56:39 EST
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 12:16:59PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Argh. This looks like morning person meets night owl.
> Indded :-)
>> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 04:53:11PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> >> > When mounting a filesystem on a block device there is currently
>> >> > no verification that the user has appropriate access to the
>> >> > device file passed to mount. This has not been an issue so far
>> >> > since the user in question has always been root, but this must
>> >> > be changed before allowing unprivileged users to mount in user
>> >> > namespaces.
>> >> >
>> >> > To do this, a new version of lookup_bdev() is added named
>> >> > lookup_bdev_perm(). Both of these functions become wrappers
>> >> > around a common inner fucntion. The behavior of lookup_bdev() is
>> >> > unchanged, but calling lookup_bdev_perm() will fail if the user
>> >> > does not have the specified access rights to the supplied path.
>> >> > The permission check is skipped if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
>> >> > avoid any possible regressions in behavior.
>> >> >
>> >> > blkdev_get_by_path() is updated to use lookup_bdev_perm(). This
>> >> > is used by mount_bdev() and mount_mtd(), so this will cause
>> >> > mounts on block devices to fail when the user lacks the required
>> >> > permissions. Other calls to blkdev_get_by_path() will all happen
>> >> > with root privileges, so these calls will be unaffected.
>> >> Good but buggy patch.
>> >> In the mtd bits the flags are super flags, not file mode bits,
>> >> which makes testing them against FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE is
>> >> incorrect.
>> > Bah, yes. Fixed.
>> >> Further it looks like quite a few more possibly all of the lookup_bdev
>> >> instances could use inode level permission checking.
>> >> Certainly code such as quotactl makes me wonder.
>> > I opted to stick to places related to mounting, but let's take a look at
>> > the other callers.
>> > bcache calls it in the context of sysfs writes, and those attributes are
>> > writable only by root. In that case the inode permission check will be
>> > skipped anyway, so it makes no difference either way.
>> > Device mapper calls it in dm_get_device, which is called from a bunch of
>> > places. I had started trying to walk back through all the callers of
>> > dm_get_device, but that rabbit hole got really deep really quickly so I
>> > didn't feel confident that changing it wouldn't break anyone.
>> > quotactl gave me pause, as it seems to have done for you too. I was
>> > surprised that inode permissions aren't checked, but
>> > check_quotactl_permission does get called before actually doing
>> > anything. I fear that adding a check of inode permissions could end up
>> > breaking someone.
>> My gut feel on all of this is that we should act like may_open and have
>> have a flag of 0 for access mode mean don't check permissions.
>> That way we can change all of the callers of lookup_bdev to pass an
>> additional argument and make it explicit what is going on but we don't
>> actually have to change the callers to actually perform an additional
> Sounds reasonable, I'll make that change.
>> Leaving stones unturned is a good way to introduce a security hole by
>> accident so I don't want to leave dm_get_device unreviewed, but any
>> changes can be in later patches.
> Unless I've made a mistake it shouldn't introduce security holes,
> dm_get_device should behave exactly the same was as it behaves today.
> Any security problems would already be present.
There are two parts to this. Splitting this into changes that are small
enough to be correct. And just passing in a 0 for acc_mode seems good
enough in that case. The other question is what happens when we start
allowing unprivileged users to mount things, and in general what happens
when we start relaxing permission checks.
Frankly we need to understand how everything interacts if we are to
relax permissions safely if we don't want to be chasing security issues
for the next several years as things come to lite that we have
> I can take another crack at reviewing, but it might also be good if
> someone who already knows the code commented as well. As I recall I gave
> up after getting several levels deep in indirect function calls where the
> names of the struct members which held the function pointers were
> identical at a couple of levels, so I was having a hard time knowing if
> I was keeping everything straight.
For this patch I am not concerned but we do need to understand how all
of the pieces interact and that is just plain challenging.
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