[RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2]
From: David Howells
Date: Tue Jan 19 2016 - 06:30:42 EST
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process:
(1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring
may also be used to judge the trustwortiness of a new certificate,
whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be consulted for
whatever process is being undertaken.
If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.
(2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the
system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
These patches change that:
(1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
when the trust is evaluated only.
(2) Asymmetric keys retain the source certificate signature information
for future evaluation rather than discarding it.
(3) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a
key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
created in one keyring and then linked across.
This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It
is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
keyrings such as the system keyrings.
[*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.
(4) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
contents of the system keyring.
(5) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
root of the trust relationship.
(6) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
This change also makes it possible for userspace to create a private set of
trusted keys and then to seal it by setting a manager function where the
private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust relationships.
Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:
(*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where
UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
secondary keyring (see below).
(*) An optional system blacklist keyring is created to replace the IMA
(*) A 'blacklist' key type is created that may contain a hex string in
its description (it carries no payload). When an X.509
certificate is parsed, the system blacklist is searched for a
blacklist key that matches the TBS hash of the X.509 certificate
and if one is found, the certificate is considered blacklisted.
(*) A list of blacklisted hashes can be added to the system blacklist
keyring at compile time. In the future it should also be possible
to load this up from such as the UEFI blacklist.
(*) Keys can be added to the blacklist keyring by root if the keys are
signed by a key in the builtin system keyring. These can then be
searched for by asymmetric key ID. This allows the functionality
of the IMA blacklist keyring to be replicated.
It might be worth making an asymmetric key subtype that carries no
data to be used here as the cryptographic material is then just
dead weight since the IDs are what matter.
(*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.
(*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
be vouched for by either ring of system keys.
(*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
the new secondary keyring, but they do consult the system blacklist.
(*) If the kernel sees a PKCS#7 message with more than one signature, at
least one of which is blacklisted, it will permit the message if at
least one of the non-blacklisted signature chains is vouched for. If
none are, then EKEYREJECTED will be given. This error takes priority
over giving ENOPKG for unsupported encryption.
The patches can be found here also:
David Howells (20):
KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key
KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted
X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially
KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key
KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct
X.509: Retain the key verification data
X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier
PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it
X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file
KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED
PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates
IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring
certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically
IMA: Replace the .ima_mok keyring with the secondary system keyring
Documentation/security/keys.txt | 14 +
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 18 --
certs/Kconfig | 26 ++
certs/Makefile | 6 +
certs/blacklist.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++
certs/blacklist.h | 3
certs/blacklist_hashes.c | 6 +
certs/blacklist_nohashes.c | 5
certs/system_keyring.c | 141 ++++++++++---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 1
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 2
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 7 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 21 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 66 +++---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 59 +++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 12 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 44 ++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 141 ++++++-------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h | 6 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c | 209 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 40 +---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h | 5
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 51 +++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 13 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 318 +++++++++--------------------
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 2
fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 2
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 6 -
include/crypto/public_key.h | 35 +--
include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 2
include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 8 -
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 52 ++---
include/linux/key-type.h | 1
include/linux/key.h | 39 +++-
include/linux/verification.h | 49 ++++
include/linux/verify_pefile.h | 22 --
kernel/module_signing.c | 7 -
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2
net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 4
security/integrity/digsig.c | 10 +
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 18 +-
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 18 --
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 55 -----
security/keys/key.c | 44 +++-
security/keys/keyring.c | 26 ++
security/keys/persistent.c | 4
security/keys/process_keys.c | 16 +
security/keys/request_key.c | 4
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2
52 files changed, 1131 insertions(+), 722 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 certs/blacklist.c
create mode 100644 certs/blacklist.h
create mode 100644 certs/blacklist_hashes.c
create mode 100644 certs/blacklist_nohashes.c
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/verification.h
delete mode 100644 include/linux/verify_pefile.h
delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c