Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/1] seccomp: provide information about the previous syscall

From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Fri Jan 22 2016 - 12:17:43 EST

On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Jann Horn <jann@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 03:30:00PM +0900, Daniel Sangorrin wrote:
>> This patch allows applications to restrict the order in which
>> its system calls may be requested. In order to do that, we
>> provide seccomp-BPF scripts with information about the
>> previous system call requested.
>> An example use case consists of detecting (and stopping) return
>> oriented attacks that disturb the normal execution flow of
>> a user program.
> The intent here is to mitigate attacks in which an attacker has
> e.g. a function pointer overwrite without a high degree of stack
> control or the ability to perform a stack pivot, correct? So that
> e.g. a one-gadget system() call won't succeed?
> Do you have data on how effective this protection is using just
> the previous system call number?
> I think that for example, the "magic ROP gadget" in glibc that
> can be used given just a single pointer overwrite and stdin
> control (,
> which (as far as I can tell) is in the middle of the system()
> implementation, could be used as long as a transition to one of
> the following syscalls is allowed:
> - rt_sigaction
> - rt_sigprocmask
> - clone
> - execve
> I'm not sure how many interesting syscalls typically transition
> to that, perhaps you can comment on that?

rt_sigaction is going to be a problem. It can legitimately follow
*anything* because of async signals.

In general, I think I don't like this idea. It seems like a hack that
we'll have to support forever that will allow semi-reliable IDS
signatures to break due to async signals and occasionally detect
intrusions that don't modify themselves slightly to evade detection.