Re: ARM PCI/MSI KVM passthrough with GICv2M

[Christoffer Dall]

On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 11:17:00AM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Feb 2016 18:32:07 +0100
> Eric Auger <eric.auger@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Alex,
> > 
> > I tried to sketch a proposal for guaranteeing the IRQ integrity when
> > doing ARM PCI/MSI passthrough with ARM GICv2M msi-controller. This is
> > based on extended VFIO group viability control, as detailed below.
> > 
> > As opposed to ARM GICv3 ITS, this MSI controller does *not* support IRQ
> > remapping. It can expose 1 or more 4kB MSI frame. Each frame contains a
> > single register where the msi data is written.
> > 
> > I would be grateful to you if you could tell me whether it makes any sense.
> > 
> > Thanks in advance
> > 
> > Best Regards
> > 
> > Eric
> > 
> > 
> > 1) GICv2m with a single 4kB single frame
> >    all devices having this msi-controller as msi-parent share this
> >    single MSI frame. Those devices can work on behalf of the host
> >    or work on behalf of 1 or more guests (KVM assigned devices). We
> >    must make sure either the host only or 1 single VM can access to the
> >    single frame to guarantee interrupt integrity: a device assigned
> >    to 1 VM should not be able to trigger MSI targeted to the host
> >    or another VM.
> > 
> >    I would propose to extend the VFIO notion of group viability.
> >    Currently a VFIO group is viable if:
> >    all devices belonging to the same group are bound to a VFIO driver
> >    or unbound.
> > 
> >    Let's imagine we extend the viability check as follows:
> > 
> >    0) keep the current viable check: all the devices belonging to
> >       the group must be vfio bound or unbound.
> >    1) retrieve the MSI parent of the device and list all the
> >       other devices using that MSI controller as MSI-parent (does not
> >       look straightforward):
> >    2) they must be VFIO driver bound or unbound as well (meaning
> >       they are not used by the host). If not, reject device attachment
> >    - in case they are VFIO bound (a VFIO group is set):
> >      x if all VFIO containers are the same as the one of the device's
> >        we try to attach, that's OK. This means the other devices
> >        use different IOMMU mappings, eventually will target the
> >        MSI frame but they all work for the same user space client/VM.
> >      x 1 or more devices has a different container than the device
> >        under attachment:
> >        It works on behalf of a different user space client/VM,
> >        we can't attach the new device. I think there is a case however
> >        where severals containers can be opened by a single QEMU.
> > 
> > Of course the dynamic aspects, ie a new device showing up or an unbind
> > event bring significant complexity.
> > 
> > 2) GICv2M with multiple 4kB frames
> >    Each msi-frame is enumerated as msi-controller. The device tree
> >    statically defines which device is attached to each msi frame.
> >    In case devices are assigned we cannot change this attachment
> >    anyway since there might be physical contraints behind.
> >    So devices likely to be assigned to guests should be linked to a
> >    different MSI frame than devices that are not.
> > 
> >    I think extended viability concept can be used as well.
> > 
> >    This model still is not ideal: in case we have a SR-IOV device
> >    plugged onto an host bridge attached to a single MSI parent you won't
> >    be able anyway to have 1 Virtual Function working for host and 1 VF
> >    working for a guest. Only Interrupt translation (ITS) will bring that
> >    feature.
> > 
> > 3) GICv3 ITS
> >    This one supports interrupt translation service ~ Intel
> >    IRQ remapping.
> >    This means a single frame can be used by all devices. A deviceID is
> >    used exclusively by the host or a guest. I assume the ITS driver
> >    allocates/populates deviceid interrupt translation table featuring
> >    separate LPI spaces ie by construction different ITT cannot feature
> >    same LPIs. So no need to do the extended viability test.
> > 
> >    The MSI controller should have a property telling whether
> >    it supports interrupt translation. This kind of property currently
> >    exists on IOMMU side for INTEL remapping.
> > 
> 
> Hi Eric,
> 
> Would anyone be terribly upset if we simply assume the worst case
> scenario on GICv2m/M, have the IOMMU not claim IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP, and
> require the user to opt-in via the allow_unsafe_interrupts on the
> vfio_iommu_type1 module?  That would make it very compatible with what
> we already do on x86, where it really is all or nothing.  

meaning either you allow unsafe multiplexing with passthrough in every
flavor (unsafely) or you don't allow it at all?

I didn't know such on option existed, but it seems to me that this fits
the bill exactly.


> My assumption
> is that GICv2 would be phased out in favor of GICv3, so there's always
> a hardware upgrade path to having more complete isolation, but the
> return on investment for figuring out whether a given device really has
> this sort of isolation seems pretty low.  Often users already have some
> degree of trust in the VMs they use for device assignment anyway.  An
> especially prudent user can still look at the hardware specs for their
> specific system to understand whether any devices are fully isolated
> and only make use of those for device assignment.  Does that seem like
> a reasonable alternative?
> 

It sounds good to me, that would allow us to release a GICv2m-based
solution for MSI passthrough on currently available hardware like the
Seattle.

Thanks,
-Christoffer