Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM for forced ptrace poke

From: Stephen Smalley
Date: Thu Nov 03 2016 - 09:18:57 EST


On 11/02/2016 11:04 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> This restricts forced writes to private R+X mappings using the EXECMEM
> permission. To avoid a breaking change, a new policy capability needs to
> be enabled before the new restrictions take effect.
>
> Unlike most other SELinux hooks, this one takes the subject credentials as
> an argument instead of looking up current_cred(). This is done because the
> security_forced_write() LSM hook can be invoked from within the write
> handler of /proc/$pid/mem, where current_cred() is pretty useless.
>
> Changed in v3:
> - minor: symmetric comment (Ingo Molnar)
> - use helper struct (Ingo Molnar)
> - add new policy capability for enabling forced write checks
> (Stephen Smalley)
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 ++
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +++
> 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 09fd6108e421..cdd9c53db2ed 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2144,6 +2144,20 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
> }
>
> +static int selinux_forced_write(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> + const struct gup_creds *creds)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Permitting a write to readonly memory is fine - making the readonly
> + * memory executable afterwards would require EXECMOD permission because
> + * anon_vma would be non-NULL.
> + */
> + if (!selinux_policycap_forcedwrite || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) == 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> + return cred_has_perm(creds->subject, creds->object, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
> {
> @@ -6085,6 +6099,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(forced_write, selinux_forced_write),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 308a286c6cbe..87228f0ff09c 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ enum {
> POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
> POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1,
> POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
> + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_FORCEDWRITE,
> __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
> };
> #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
> @@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ enum {
> extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
> extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
> extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
> +extern int selinux_policycap_forcedwrite;
>
> /*
> * type_datum properties
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index 72c145dd799f..a646cb801242 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ static char *policycap_names[] = {
> "network_peer_controls",
> "open_perms",
> "redhat1",
> - "always_check_network"
> + "always_check_network",
> + "forced_write"

This is a nit, but can you provide a more descriptive capability name
that would be meaningful to policy writers and signifies that this
policy capability enables checking execmem in these situations?

> };
>
> unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 082b20c78363..4017810030d6 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
> int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
> int selinux_policycap_openperm;
> int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
> +int selinux_policycap_forcedwrite;
>
> static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
>
> @@ -1990,6 +1991,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
> POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
> selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
> POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
> + selinux_policycap_forcedwrite = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
> + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_FORCEDWRITE);
> }
>
> static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
>