Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
From: Petko Manolov
Date: Thu Nov 17 2016 - 05:22:27 EST
On 16-11-17 09:56:00, David Howells wrote:
> Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On 16-11-16 18:11:13, David Howells wrote:
> > > Allow keys to be added to the system secondary certificates keyring during
> > > kernel initialisation in an unrestricted fashion. Such keys are
> > > implicitly trusted and don't have their trust chains checked on link.
> > Well, I for one do not explicitly trust these keys. I may even want to
> > completely remove or replace them.
> Fine be me. However, if you remove them all I would guess that you cannot
> perform a secure boot.
Maybe not on PC, but there's plenty of other architectures out there. What if i
replace all UEFI keys with my own?
> Note that it's to be expected that the keys being loaded from the UEFI
> database cannot have their signatures checked - which is why they would have
> to be implicitly trusted. For the same reason, the kernel does not check the
> signatures on the keys compiled into the kernel image.
I build all kernels that matter to me and i _do_ trust myself. Unfortunately i
can't say the same for any corporation out there.
Trusting a key because your vendor shipped the HW with it so that you have no
way to verify the signature is pretty weak argument IMHO.
However, I am also well aware that most people just don't care. :)
> > > This allows keys in the UEFI database to be added in secure boot mode for
> > > the purposes of module signing.
> > The key import should not be automatic, it should be optional.
> You can argue this either way. There's a config option to allow you to turn
> this on or off. Arguably, this should be split in two: one for the whitelist
> (db, MokListRT) and one for the blacklist (dbx).
I did not see the config option. There is one?
Right now i can't decide whether whitelist should go along with blacklist or
there should be separate options. I guess for whoever goes down this path it
would make sense to use either both or none of them.
> Further, possibly I should add an option that allows this to be restricted to
> secure boot mode only.
Please do. It doesn't make much sense otherwise.
> > Same applies to the validation process.
> Depends what you mean by "the validation process"? The use of secure boot at
> all? The checking of signatures on keys? Module signing?
Nevermind. The keys signature can't be verified in the classic UEFI case.