Re: [PATCH RFC] user-namespaced file capabilities - now with even more magic
From: Eric W. Biederman
Date: Thu Dec 08 2016 - 00:17:03 EST
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 05:43:09PM +1300, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> > Root in a user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
>> > security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
>> > unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a
>> > namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
>> > host.
>> > This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
>> > vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
>> > vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (i.e. the uid_t in
>> > init_user_ns) of the root id (uid 0 in a namespace) in whose namespaces
>> > the file capabilities may take effect.
>> > When a task in a user ns (which is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP toward
>> > that user_ns) asks to write v2 security.capability, the kernel will
>> > transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid.
>> > Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
>> > its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
>> > will run the file with capabilities.
>> > If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a
>> > uid (valid within its own user namespace, over which it has CAP_SETFCAP)
>> > for the xattr. The kernel will translate that to the absolute uid, and
>> > write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will
>> > not be able to use those capabilities, but a task in a namespace where
>> > the given uid is root will.
>> > Only a single security.capability xattr may be written. A task may
>> > overwrite the existing one so long as it was written by a user mapped
>> > into his own user_ns over which he has CAP_SETFCAP.
>> > This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
>> > allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
>> > the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
>> > namespace.
>> Any chance of a singed-off-by?
> Yes, sorry, StÃphane had pointed out that I'd apparently forgotten to do
> -s. Do you want me to resend the whole shebang, or does
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> suffice? (My previous iterations did have it fwiw so I don't think I could
> legally disavow it now :)
That should be good enough. I just wanted to make certain it existed
The whole inode->i_op->getxattr reference was also a bit of a problem
as that method was removed in 4.9-rc1 but otherwise things are looking