Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Improved seccomp logging
From: Kees Cook
Date: Thu Feb 16 2017 - 18:29:32 EST
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 7:24 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> This patch set is the third revision of the following two previously
>> submitted patch sets:
>> v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1483375990-14948-1-git-send-email-tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> v1: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1483377999-15019-2-git-send-email-tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> v2: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486100262-32391-1-git-send-email-tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> The patch set aims to address some known deficiencies in seccomp's current
>> logging capabilities:
>> 1. Inability to log all filter actions.
>> 2. Inability to selectively enable filtering; e.g. devs want noisy logging,
>> users want relative quiet.
>> 3. Consistent behavior with audit enabled and disabled.
>> 4. Inability to easily develop a filter due to the lack of a
>> permissive/complain mode.
> I think I dislike this, but I think my dislikes may be fixable with
> minor changes.
> What I dislike is that this mixes app-specific built-in configuration
> (seccomp) with global privileged stuff (audit). The result is a
> potentially difficult to use situation in which you need to modify an
> app to make it loggable (using RET_LOG) and then fiddle with
> privileged config (auditctl, etc) to actually see the logs.
You make a good point about RET_LOG vs log_max_action. I think making
RET_LOG the default value would work for 99% of the cases.
> What if, instead of logging straight to the audit log, SECCOMP_RET_LOG
>  merely meant "tell our parent about this syscall"? (Ideally we'd
> also figure out a way to express "log this and allow", "log this and
> do ERRNO", etc.) Then we could have another mechanism that installs a
> layer in the seccomp stack that, instead of catching syscalls, catches
> log events and sticks them in a ring buffer (or audit).
So, I really don't like this because it's yet another logging system.
We already have a security event logger: audit. This continues to use
that subsystem without changing semantics very much.
> Concretely, it might work like this. If a filter returns
> SECCOMP_RET_LOG, then we "log" and keep processing. SECCOMP_RET_LOG
> is otherwise treated literally like SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW and has no
> effect on return value. If you want log-and-kill, you install two
> There's a new seccomp(2) action that returns an fd. That fd
> references a new thing in the seccomp stack that is a BPF program that
> is called whenever SECCOMP_RET_LOG is returned from lower down. The
> output of this filter determines whether the log event is ignored,
> stuck in the ring buffer, or passed up the stack for further
> processing. You read(2) the fd to access the ring buffer.
> Using this mechanism, you could write a simple seccomptrace tool that
> needs no privilege and dumps SECCOMP_RET_LOG events from the target
> program to stderr.
If someone was going to do this, they could just as well set up a
tracer to use RET_TRAP. (And this is what things like minijail does
already, IIRC.) The reality of the situation is that this is way too
much overhead for the common case. We need a generalized logging
system that uses the existing logging mechanisms.
>  If we went this route, it might want to be renamed.
> P.S. We ought to be able to write a BPF verifier pass that makes sure
> that filters don't return unsupported return values if we cared to do
Can we? I thought the BPF_RET used the BPF registers, and validating
that might be less-than-easy?