[PATCH 4.10 08/62] bpf: improve verifier packet range checks

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon May 01 2017 - 17:46:08 EST


4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxx>


[ Upstream commit b1977682a3858b5584ffea7cfb7bd863f68db18d ]

llvm can optimize the 'if (ptr > data_end)' checks to be in the order
slightly different than the original C code which will confuse verifier.
Like:
if (ptr + 16 > data_end)
return TC_ACT_SHOT;
// may be followed by
if (ptr + 14 > data_end)
return TC_ACT_SHOT;
while llvm can see that 'ptr' is valid for all 16 bytes,
the verifier could not.
Fix verifier logic to account for such case and add a test.

Reported-by: Huapeng Zhou <hzhou@xxxxxx>
Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++--
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1859,14 +1859,15 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struc

for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
- regs[i].range = dst_reg->off;
+ /* keep the maximum range already checked */
+ regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);

for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
- reg->range = dst_reg->off;
+ reg->range = max(reg->range, dst_reg->off);
}
}

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2876,6 +2876,26 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT,
},
{
+ "overlapping checks for direct packet access",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 6),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3, 1),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT,
+ },
+ {
"invalid access of tc_classid for LWT_IN",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,