[GIT pull] x86/pti: The real thing

From: Thomas Gleixner
Date: Thu Dec 28 2017 - 15:35:08 EST


Linus,

please pull the latest x86-pti-for-linus git tree from:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-pti-for-linus

This is the final set of enabling page table isolation on x86:

- Infrastructure patches for handling the extra page tables.

- Patches which map the various bits and pieces which are required to get
in and out of user space into the user space visible page tables.

- The required changes to have CR3 switching in the entry/exit code.

- Optimizations for the CR3 switching along with documentation how the
ASID/PCID mechanism works.

- Updates to dump pagetables to cover the user space page tables for W+X
scans and extra debugfs files to analyze both the kernel and the user
space visible page tables

The whole functionality is compile time controlled via a config switch
and can be turned on/off on the command line as well.

There is a trivial conflict in efi_alloc_page_tables() because the x86/pti
branch still has the __GFP_NOTRACK allocation flag as it's based on 4.14
for known reasons.

Thanks,

tglx

------------------>
Andy Lutomirski (6):
x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs
x86/mm/pti: Share cpu_entry_area with user space page tables
x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space
x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map
x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on
x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed

Borislav Petkov (2):
x86/pti: Add the pti= cmdline option and documentation
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add page table directory to the debugfs VFS hierarchy

Dave Hansen (10):
x86/mm/pti: Disable global pages if PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y
x86/mm/pti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching
x86/mm/pti: Add mapping helper functions
x86/mm/pti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd
x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD
x86/mm/pti: Populate user PGD
x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches
x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3
x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single()
x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig

Hugh Dickins (1):
x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area

Peter Zijlstra (3):
x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches
x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3
x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID naming

Thomas Gleixner (9):
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE
x86/mm/pti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation
x86/mm/pti: Force entry through trampoline when PTI active
x86/entry: Align entry text section to PMD boundary
x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD
x86/cpu_entry_area: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables
x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO

Vlastimil Babka (1):
x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled


Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 5 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c | 3 +
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 145 +++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 48 ++-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 24 +-
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 130 +++++---
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 23 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 13 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h | 36 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 59 +++-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 11 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 92 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 23 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h | 14 +
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 202 +++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 30 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 144 ++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 11 +-
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 +
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 7 +-
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 27 ++
arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c | 80 ++++-
arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 43 ++-
arch/x86/mm/init.c | 80 +++--
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 387 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 58 +++-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 5 +-
include/linux/pti.h | 11 +
init/main.c | 3 +
security/Kconfig | 10 +
tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c | 3 +-
45 files changed, 1636 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/pti.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/pti.h

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 05496622b4ef..520fdec15bbb 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2685,6 +2685,8 @@
steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler
behaviour

+ nopti [X86-64] Disable kernel page table isolation
+
nolapic [X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC.

nolapic_timer [X86-32,APIC] Do not use the local APIC timer.
@@ -3253,6 +3255,12 @@
pt. [PARIDE]
See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.

+ pti= [X86_64]
+ Control user/kernel address space isolation:
+ on - enable
+ off - disable
+ auto - default setting
+
pty.legacy_count=
[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
default number.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
index 51101708a03a..ad41b3813f0a 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40 bits) virtual memory map (1TB)
... unused hole ...
ffffec0000000000 - fffffbffffffffff (=44 bits) kasan shadow memory (16TB)
... unused hole ...
+fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
... unused hole ...
@@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ Virtual memory map with 5 level page tables:
hole caused by [56:63] sign extension
ff00000000000000 - ff0fffffffffffff (=52 bits) guard hole, reserved for hypervisor
ff10000000000000 - ff8fffffffffffff (=55 bits) direct mapping of all phys. memory
-ff90000000000000 - ff91ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
-ff92000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space
+ff90000000000000 - ff9fffffffffffff (=52 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ffa0000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space (12800 TB)
ffd2000000000000 - ffd3ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits) virtual memory map (512TB)
... unused hole ...
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
index 972319ff5b01..e691ff734cb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
*/
#undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT

+/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+
#include "misc.h"

/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 3fd8bc560fae..45a63e00a6af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/page_types.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>

/*

@@ -187,6 +192,146 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
#endif
.endm

+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+
+/*
+ * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k. Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
+ * halves:
+ */
+#define PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK (1<<PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK (PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK|(1<<X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT))
+
+.macro SET_NOFLUSH_BIT reg:req
+ bts $X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, \reg
+.endm
+
+.macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID
+ /* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
+ andq $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \reg
+.endm
+
+.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
+ mov %cr3, \scratch_reg
+ ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
+ mov \scratch_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+#define THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask \
+ PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tlbstate) + TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask
+
+.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg:req scratch_reg2:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
+ mov %cr3, \scratch_reg
+
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lwrcr3_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PCID
+
+ /*
+ * Test if the ASID needs a flush.
+ */
+ movq \scratch_reg, \scratch_reg2
+ andq $(0x7FF), \scratch_reg /* mask ASID */
+ bt \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
+ jnc .Lnoflush_\@
+
+ /* Flush needed, clear the bit */
+ btr \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
+ movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
+ jmp .Lwrcr3_\@
+
+.Lnoflush_\@:
+ movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
+ SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \scratch_reg
+
+.Lwrcr3_\@:
+ /* Flip the PGD and ASID to the user version */
+ orq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
+ mov \scratch_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg:req
+ pushq %rax
+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg=\scratch_reg scratch_reg2=%rax
+ popq %rax
+.endm
+
+.macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Ldone_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
+ movq %cr3, \scratch_reg
+ movq \scratch_reg, \save_reg
+ /*
+ * Is the "switch mask" all zero? That means that both of
+ * these are zero:
+ *
+ * 1. The user/kernel PCID bit, and
+ * 2. The user/kernel "bit" that points CR3 to the
+ * bottom half of the 8k PGD
+ *
+ * That indicates a kernel CR3 value, not a user CR3.
+ */
+ testq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
+ jz .Ldone_\@
+
+ ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
+ movq \scratch_reg, %cr3
+
+.Ldone_\@:
+.endm
+
+.macro RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
+
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lwrcr3_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PCID
+
+ /*
+ * KERNEL pages can always resume with NOFLUSH as we do
+ * explicit flushes.
+ */
+ bt $X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT, \save_reg
+ jnc .Lnoflush_\@
+
+ /*
+ * Check if there's a pending flush for the user ASID we're
+ * about to set.
+ */
+ movq \save_reg, \scratch_reg
+ andq $(0x7FF), \scratch_reg
+ bt \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
+ jnc .Lnoflush_\@
+
+ btr \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
+ jmp .Lwrcr3_\@
+
+.Lnoflush_\@:
+ SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \save_reg
+
+.Lwrcr3_\@:
+ /*
+ * The CR3 write could be avoided when not changing its value,
+ * but would require a CR3 read *and* a scratch register.
+ */
+ movq \save_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
+
+.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
+.endm
+.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg:req scratch_reg2:req
+.endm
+.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg:req
+.endm
+.macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+.endm
+.macro RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+.endm
+
+#endif
+
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 87cebe78bbef..ed31d00dc5ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
-#include "calling.h"
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -40,6 +39,8 @@
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <linux/err.h>

+#include "calling.h"
+
.code64
.section .entry.text, "ax"

@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
/* Stash the user RSP. */
movq %rsp, RSP_SCRATCH

+ /* Note: using %rsp as a scratch reg. */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
+
/* Load the top of the task stack into RSP */
movq CPU_ENTRY_AREA_tss + TSS_sp1 + CPU_ENTRY_AREA, %rsp

@@ -203,6 +207,10 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
*/

swapgs
+ /*
+ * This path is not taken when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is disabled so it
+ * is not required to switch CR3.
+ */
movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp

@@ -399,6 +407,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret:
* We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live.
* We can do future final exit work right here.
*/
+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi

popq %rdi
popq %rsp
@@ -736,6 +745,8 @@ GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
* We can do future final exit work right here.
*/

+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
+
/* Restore RDI. */
popq %rdi
SWAPGS
@@ -818,7 +829,9 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
*/

pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */
- SWAPGS
+ SWAPGS /* to kernel GS */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */
+
movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi
movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */
movq (1*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user RIP */
@@ -834,7 +847,6 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
/* Now RAX == RSP. */

andl $0xffff0000, %eax /* RAX = (RSP & 0xffff0000) */
- popq %rdi /* Restore user RDI */

/*
* espfix_stack[31:16] == 0. The page tables are set up such that
@@ -845,7 +857,11 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
* still points to an RO alias of the ESPFIX stack.
*/
orq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_stack), %rax
- SWAPGS
+
+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
+ SWAPGS /* to user GS */
+ popq %rdi /* Restore user RDI */
+
movq %rax, %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8

@@ -945,6 +961,8 @@ ENTRY(switch_to_thread_stack)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC

pushq %rdi
+ /* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
movq %rsp, %rdi
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT sp_offset=16 sp_reg=ORC_REG_DI
@@ -1244,7 +1262,11 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
js 1f /* negative -> in kernel */
SWAPGS
xorl %ebx, %ebx
-1: ret
+
+1:
+ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
+
+ ret
END(paranoid_entry)

/*
@@ -1266,6 +1288,7 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
testl %ebx, %ebx /* swapgs needed? */
jnz .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
+ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
jmp .Lparanoid_exit_restore
.Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
@@ -1293,6 +1316,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* from user mode due to an IRET fault.
*/
SWAPGS
+ /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax

.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1339,6 +1364,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
*/
SWAPGS
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
jmp .Lerror_entry_done

.Lbstep_iret:
@@ -1348,10 +1374,11 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)

.Lerror_bad_iret:
/*
- * We came from an IRET to user mode, so we have user gsbase.
- * Switch to kernel gsbase:
+ * We came from an IRET to user mode, so we have user
+ * gsbase and CR3. Switch to kernel gsbase and CR3:
*/
SWAPGS
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax

/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1383,6 +1410,10 @@ END(error_exit)
/*
* Runs on exception stack. Xen PV does not go through this path at all,
* so we can use real assembly here.
+ *
+ * Registers:
+ * %r14: Used to save/restore the CR3 of the interrupted context
+ * when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use. Do not clobber.
*/
ENTRY(nmi)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
@@ -1446,6 +1477,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)

swapgs
cld
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdx
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8
@@ -1698,6 +1730,8 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
movq $-1, %rsi
call do_nmi

+ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
+
testl %ebx, %ebx /* swapgs needed? */
jnz nmi_restore
nmi_swapgs:
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 95ad40eb7eff..40f17009ec20 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
/* Interrupts are off on entry. */
SWAPGS
+
+ /* We are about to clobber %rsp anyway, clobbering here is OK */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
+
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp

/*
@@ -216,6 +220,12 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */

/*
+ * We just saved %rdi so it is safe to clobber. It is not
+ * preserved during the C calls inside TRACE_IRQS_OFF anyway.
+ */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
+
+ /*
* User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and SYSENTER
* turned them off.
*/
@@ -256,10 +266,22 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
* when the system call started, which is already known to user
* code. We zero R8-R10 to avoid info leaks.
*/
+ movq RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsp
+
+ /*
+ * The original userspace %rsp (RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)) is stored
+ * on the process stack which is not mapped to userspace and
+ * not readable after we SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3. Delay the CR3
+ * switch until after after the last reference to the process
+ * stack.
+ *
+ * %r8/%r9 are zeroed before the sysret, thus safe to clobber.
+ */
+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg=%r8 scratch_reg2=%r9
+
xorq %r8, %r8
xorq %r9, %r9
xorq %r10, %r10
- movq RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsp
swapgs
sysretl
END(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 1faf40f2dda9..577fa8adb785 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -344,14 +344,14 @@ int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
* vsyscalls but leave the page not present. If so, we skip calling
* this.
*/
-static void __init set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(void)
+void __init set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;

- pgd = pgd_offset_k(VSYSCALL_ADDR);
+ pgd = pgd_offset_pgd(root, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(pgd_val(*pgd) | _PAGE_USER));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 5
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
vsyscall_mode == NATIVE
? PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL
: PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
- set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits();
+ set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
}

BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
index 3674a4b6f8bd..8f0aace08b87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
@@ -3,16 +3,18 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>

+#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>

#include "../perf_event.h"

+/* Waste a full page so it can be mapped into the cpu_entry_area */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct debug_store, cpu_debug_store);
+
/* The size of a BTS record in bytes: */
#define BTS_RECORD_SIZE 24

-#define BTS_BUFFER_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << 4)
-#define PEBS_BUFFER_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << 4)
#define PEBS_FIXUP_SIZE PAGE_SIZE

/*
@@ -279,17 +281,52 @@ void fini_debug_store_on_cpu(int cpu)

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, insn_buffer);

-static int alloc_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
+static void ds_update_cea(void *cea, void *addr, size_t size, pgprot_t prot)
{
- struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
+ phys_addr_t pa;
+ size_t msz = 0;
+
+ pa = virt_to_phys(addr);
+ for (; msz < size; msz += PAGE_SIZE, pa += PAGE_SIZE, cea += PAGE_SIZE)
+ cea_set_pte(cea, pa, prot);
+}
+
+static void ds_clear_cea(void *cea, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t msz = 0;
+
+ for (; msz < size; msz += PAGE_SIZE, cea += PAGE_SIZE)
+ cea_set_pte(cea, 0, PAGE_NONE);
+}
+
+static void *dsalloc_pages(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned int order = get_order(size);
int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
- int max;
- void *buffer, *ibuffer;
+ struct page *page;
+
+ page = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags | __GFP_ZERO, order);
+ return page ? page_address(page) : NULL;
+}
+
+static void dsfree_pages(const void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ if (buffer)
+ free_pages((unsigned long)buffer, get_order(size));
+}
+
+static int alloc_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
+{
+ struct cpu_hw_events *hwev = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events, cpu);
+ struct debug_store *ds = hwev->ds;
+ size_t bsiz = x86_pmu.pebs_buffer_size;
+ int max, node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ void *buffer, *ibuffer, *cea;

if (!x86_pmu.pebs)
return 0;

- buffer = kzalloc_node(x86_pmu.pebs_buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL, node);
+ buffer = dsalloc_pages(bsiz, GFP_KERNEL, cpu);
if (unlikely(!buffer))
return -ENOMEM;

@@ -300,25 +337,27 @@ static int alloc_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.pebs_format < 2) {
ibuffer = kzalloc_node(PEBS_FIXUP_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, node);
if (!ibuffer) {
- kfree(buffer);
+ dsfree_pages(buffer, bsiz);
return -ENOMEM;
}
per_cpu(insn_buffer, cpu) = ibuffer;
}
-
- max = x86_pmu.pebs_buffer_size / x86_pmu.pebs_record_size;
-
- ds->pebs_buffer_base = (u64)(unsigned long)buffer;
+ hwev->ds_pebs_vaddr = buffer;
+ /* Update the cpu entry area mapping */
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_buffers.pebs_buffer;
+ ds->pebs_buffer_base = (unsigned long) cea;
+ ds_update_cea(cea, buffer, bsiz, PAGE_KERNEL);
ds->pebs_index = ds->pebs_buffer_base;
- ds->pebs_absolute_maximum = ds->pebs_buffer_base +
- max * x86_pmu.pebs_record_size;
-
+ max = x86_pmu.pebs_record_size * (bsiz / x86_pmu.pebs_record_size);
+ ds->pebs_absolute_maximum = ds->pebs_buffer_base + max;
return 0;
}

static void release_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
{
- struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
+ struct cpu_hw_events *hwev = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events, cpu);
+ struct debug_store *ds = hwev->ds;
+ void *cea;

if (!ds || !x86_pmu.pebs)
return;
@@ -326,73 +365,70 @@ static void release_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
kfree(per_cpu(insn_buffer, cpu));
per_cpu(insn_buffer, cpu) = NULL;

- kfree((void *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_buffer_base);
+ /* Clear the fixmap */
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_buffers.pebs_buffer;
+ ds_clear_cea(cea, x86_pmu.pebs_buffer_size);
ds->pebs_buffer_base = 0;
+ dsfree_pages(hwev->ds_pebs_vaddr, x86_pmu.pebs_buffer_size);
+ hwev->ds_pebs_vaddr = NULL;
}

static int alloc_bts_buffer(int cpu)
{
- struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
- int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
- int max, thresh;
- void *buffer;
+ struct cpu_hw_events *hwev = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events, cpu);
+ struct debug_store *ds = hwev->ds;
+ void *buffer, *cea;
+ int max;

if (!x86_pmu.bts)
return 0;

- buffer = kzalloc_node(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN, node);
+ buffer = dsalloc_pages(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN, cpu);
if (unlikely(!buffer)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: BTS buffer allocation failure\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
-
- max = BTS_BUFFER_SIZE / BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
- thresh = max / 16;
-
- ds->bts_buffer_base = (u64)(unsigned long)buffer;
+ hwev->ds_bts_vaddr = buffer;
+ /* Update the fixmap */
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_buffers.bts_buffer;
+ ds->bts_buffer_base = (unsigned long) cea;
+ ds_update_cea(cea, buffer, BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL);
ds->bts_index = ds->bts_buffer_base;
- ds->bts_absolute_maximum = ds->bts_buffer_base +
- max * BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
- ds->bts_interrupt_threshold = ds->bts_absolute_maximum -
- thresh * BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
-
+ max = BTS_RECORD_SIZE * (BTS_BUFFER_SIZE / BTS_RECORD_SIZE);
+ ds->bts_absolute_maximum = ds->bts_buffer_base + max;
+ ds->bts_interrupt_threshold = ds->bts_absolute_maximum - (max / 16);
return 0;
}

static void release_bts_buffer(int cpu)
{
- struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
+ struct cpu_hw_events *hwev = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events, cpu);
+ struct debug_store *ds = hwev->ds;
+ void *cea;

if (!ds || !x86_pmu.bts)
return;

- kfree((void *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_buffer_base);
+ /* Clear the fixmap */
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_buffers.bts_buffer;
+ ds_clear_cea(cea, BTS_BUFFER_SIZE);
ds->bts_buffer_base = 0;
+ dsfree_pages(hwev->ds_bts_vaddr, BTS_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ hwev->ds_bts_vaddr = NULL;
}

static int alloc_ds_buffer(int cpu)
{
- int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
- struct debug_store *ds;
-
- ds = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*ds), GFP_KERNEL, node);
- if (unlikely(!ds))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct debug_store *ds = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_store;

+ memset(ds, 0, sizeof(*ds));
per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds = ds;
-
return 0;
}

static void release_ds_buffer(int cpu)
{
- struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
-
- if (!ds)
- return;
-
per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds = NULL;
- kfree(ds);
}

void release_ds_buffers(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
index f7aaadf9331f..8e4ea143ed96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@

#include <linux/perf_event.h>

+#include <asm/intel_ds.h>
+
/* To enable MSR tracing please use the generic trace points. */

/*
@@ -77,8 +79,6 @@ struct amd_nb {
struct event_constraint event_constraints[X86_PMC_IDX_MAX];
};

-/* The maximal number of PEBS events: */
-#define MAX_PEBS_EVENTS 8
#define PEBS_COUNTER_MASK ((1ULL << MAX_PEBS_EVENTS) - 1)

/*
@@ -95,23 +95,6 @@ struct amd_nb {
PERF_SAMPLE_TRANSACTION | PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR | \
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR | PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER)

-/*
- * A debug store configuration.
- *
- * We only support architectures that use 64bit fields.
- */
-struct debug_store {
- u64 bts_buffer_base;
- u64 bts_index;
- u64 bts_absolute_maximum;
- u64 bts_interrupt_threshold;
- u64 pebs_buffer_base;
- u64 pebs_index;
- u64 pebs_absolute_maximum;
- u64 pebs_interrupt_threshold;
- u64 pebs_event_reset[MAX_PEBS_EVENTS];
-};
-
#define PEBS_REGS \
(PERF_REG_X86_AX | \
PERF_REG_X86_BX | \
@@ -216,6 +199,8 @@ struct cpu_hw_events {
* Intel DebugStore bits
*/
struct debug_store *ds;
+ void *ds_pebs_vaddr;
+ void *ds_bts_vaddr;
u64 pebs_enabled;
int n_pebs;
int n_large_pebs;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 2fbc69a0916e..4a7884b8dca5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@

#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/intel_ds.h>

/*
* cpu_entry_area is a percpu region that contains things needed by the CPU
@@ -40,6 +41,18 @@ struct cpu_entry_area {
*/
char exception_stacks[(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1) * EXCEPTION_STKSZ + DEBUG_STKSZ];
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ /*
+ * Per CPU debug store for Intel performance monitoring. Wastes a
+ * full page at the moment.
+ */
+ struct debug_store cpu_debug_store;
+ /*
+ * The actual PEBS/BTS buffers must be mapped to user space
+ * Reserve enough fixmap PTEs.
+ */
+ struct debug_store_buffers cpu_debug_buffers;
+#endif
};

#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE (sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 800104c8a3ed..07cdd1715705 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -197,11 +197,12 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3 ( 7*32+ 4) /* Cache Allocation Technology L3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2 ( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3 ( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */

#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
@@ -340,5 +341,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */

#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
index bc359dd2f7f6..85e23bb7b34e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ static inline void fill_ldt(struct desc_struct *desc, const struct user_desc *in

desc->type = (info->read_exec_only ^ 1) << 1;
desc->type |= info->contents << 2;
+ /* Set the ACCESS bit so it can be mapped RO */
+ desc->type |= 1;

desc->s = 1;
desc->dpl = 0x3;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c10c9128f54e..e428e16dd822 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@
# define DISABLE_LA57 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
#endif

+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+# define DISABLE_PTI 0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -54,7 +60,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK4 (DISABLE_PCID)
#define DISABLED_MASK5 0
#define DISABLED_MASK6 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK7 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK7 (DISABLE_PTI)
#define DISABLED_MASK8 0
#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_MPX)
#define DISABLED_MASK10 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..62a9f4966b42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_INTEL_DS_H
+#define _ASM_INTEL_DS_H
+
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
+
+#define BTS_BUFFER_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << 4)
+#define PEBS_BUFFER_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << 4)
+
+/* The maximal number of PEBS events: */
+#define MAX_PEBS_EVENTS 8
+
+/*
+ * A debug store configuration.
+ *
+ * We only support architectures that use 64bit fields.
+ */
+struct debug_store {
+ u64 bts_buffer_base;
+ u64 bts_index;
+ u64 bts_absolute_maximum;
+ u64 bts_interrupt_threshold;
+ u64 pebs_buffer_base;
+ u64 pebs_index;
+ u64 pebs_absolute_maximum;
+ u64 pebs_interrupt_threshold;
+ u64 pebs_event_reset[MAX_PEBS_EVENTS];
+} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct debug_store, cpu_debug_store);
+
+struct debug_store_buffers {
+ char bts_buffer[BTS_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ char pebs_buffer[PEBS_BUFFER_SIZE];
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 5ede7cae1d67..c931b88982a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -50,10 +50,33 @@ struct ldt_struct {
* call gates. On native, we could merge the ldt_struct and LDT
* allocations, but it's not worth trying to optimize.
*/
- struct desc_struct *entries;
- unsigned int nr_entries;
+ struct desc_struct *entries;
+ unsigned int nr_entries;
+
+ /*
+ * If PTI is in use, then the entries array is not mapped while we're
+ * in user mode. The whole array will be aliased at the addressed
+ * given by ldt_slot_va(slot). We use two slots so that we can allocate
+ * and map, and enable a new LDT without invalidating the mapping
+ * of an older, still-in-use LDT.
+ *
+ * slot will be -1 if this LDT doesn't have an alias mapping.
+ */
+ int slot;
};

+/* This is a multiple of PAGE_SIZE. */
+#define LDT_SLOT_STRIDE (LDT_ENTRIES * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE)
+
+static inline void *ldt_slot_va(int slot)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ return (void *)(LDT_BASE_ADDR + LDT_SLOT_STRIDE * slot);
+#else
+ BUG();
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Used for LDT copy/destruction.
*/
@@ -64,6 +87,7 @@ static inline void init_new_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
}
int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm);
void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
+void ldt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm);
#else /* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
static inline void init_new_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
static inline int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
@@ -71,7 +95,8 @@ static inline int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+static inline void ldt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
#endif

static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -96,10 +121,31 @@ static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
* that we can see.
*/

- if (unlikely(ldt))
- set_ldt(ldt->entries, ldt->nr_entries);
- else
+ if (unlikely(ldt)) {
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE((unsigned long)ldt->slot > 1)) {
+ /*
+ * Whoops -- either the new LDT isn't mapped
+ * (if slot == -1) or is mapped into a bogus
+ * slot (if slot > 1).
+ */
+ clear_LDT();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If page table isolation is enabled, ldt->entries
+ * will not be mapped in the userspace pagetables.
+ * Tell the CPU to access the LDT through the alias
+ * at ldt_slot_va(ldt->slot).
+ */
+ set_ldt(ldt_slot_va(ldt->slot), ldt->nr_entries);
+ } else {
+ set_ldt(ldt->entries, ldt->nr_entries);
+ }
+ } else {
clear_LDT();
+ }
#else
clear_LDT();
#endif
@@ -194,6 +240,7 @@ static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
static inline void arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(mm);
+ ldt_arch_exit_mmap(mm);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index 4b5e1eafada7..aff42e1da6ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_p4d(unsigned long pfn) {}
*/
extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;

+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/*
+ * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is
+ * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
+ * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves.
+ */
+#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 1
+#else
+#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 0
+#endif
+
/*
* Allocate and free page tables.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index f735c3016325..6b43d677f8ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);

void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
+void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd, bool user);
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);

#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
@@ -846,7 +847,12 @@ static inline pud_t *pud_offset(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address)

static inline int p4d_bad(p4d_t p4d)
{
- return (p4d_flags(p4d) & ~(_KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER)) != 0;
+ unsigned long ignore_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+ return (p4d_flags(p4d) & ~ignore_flags) != 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3 */

@@ -880,7 +886,12 @@ static inline p4d_t *p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)

static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
{
- return (pgd_flags(pgd) & ~_PAGE_USER) != _KERNPG_TABLE;
+ unsigned long ignore_flags = _PAGE_USER;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+ return (pgd_flags(pgd) & ~ignore_flags) != _KERNPG_TABLE;
}

static inline int pgd_none(pgd_t pgd)
@@ -909,7 +920,11 @@ static inline int pgd_none(pgd_t pgd)
* pgd_offset() returns a (pgd_t *)
* pgd_index() is used get the offset into the pgd page's array of pgd_t's;
*/
-#define pgd_offset(mm, address) ((mm)->pgd + pgd_index((address)))
+#define pgd_offset_pgd(pgd, address) (pgd + pgd_index((address)))
+/*
+ * a shortcut to get a pgd_t in a given mm
+ */
+#define pgd_offset(mm, address) pgd_offset_pgd((mm)->pgd, (address))
/*
* a shortcut which implies the use of the kernel's pgd, instead
* of a process's
@@ -1105,7 +1120,14 @@ static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
*/
static inline void clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count)
{
- memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
+ memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+ /* Clone the user space pgd as well */
+ memcpy(kernel_to_user_pgdp(dst), kernel_to_user_pgdp(src),
+ count * sizeof(pgd_t));
+#endif
}

#define PTE_SHIFT ilog2(PTRS_PER_PTE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
index e9f05331e732..81462e9a34f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -131,9 +131,97 @@ static inline pud_t native_pudp_get_and_clear(pud_t *xp)
#endif
}

+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/*
+ * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
+ * (8k-aligned and 8k in size). The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and
+ * the user one is in the last 4k. To switch between them, you
+ * just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses.
+ */
+#define PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT PAGE_SHIFT
+
+/*
+ * This generates better code than the inline assembly in
+ * __set_bit().
+ */
+static inline void *ptr_set_bit(void *ptr, int bit)
+{
+ unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr;
+
+ __ptr |= BIT(bit);
+ return (void *)__ptr;
+}
+static inline void *ptr_clear_bit(void *ptr, int bit)
+{
+ unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr;
+
+ __ptr &= ~BIT(bit);
+ return (void *)__ptr;
+}
+
+static inline pgd_t *kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp)
+{
+ return ptr_set_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
+}
+
+static inline pgd_t *user_to_kernel_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp)
+{
+ return ptr_clear_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
+}
+
+static inline p4d_t *kernel_to_user_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
+{
+ return ptr_set_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
+}
+
+static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
+{
+ return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+
+/*
+ * Page table pages are page-aligned. The lower half of the top
+ * level is used for userspace and the top half for the kernel.
+ *
+ * Returns true for parts of the PGD that map userspace and
+ * false for the parts that map the kernel.
+ */
+static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr)
+{
+ unsigned long ptr = (unsigned long)__ptr;
+
+ return (ptr & ~PAGE_MASK) < (PAGE_SIZE / 2);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd);
+
+/*
+ * Take a PGD location (pgdp) and a pgd value that needs to be set there.
+ * Populates the user and returns the resulting PGD that must be set in
+ * the kernel copy of the page tables.
+ */
+static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return pgd;
+ return __pti_set_user_pgd(pgdp, pgd);
+}
+#else
+static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ return pgd;
+}
+#endif
+
static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
{
+#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)
+ p4dp->pgd = pti_set_user_pgd(&p4dp->pgd, p4d.pgd);
+#else
*p4dp = p4d;
+#endif
}

static inline void native_p4d_clear(p4d_t *p4d)
@@ -147,7 +235,11 @@ static inline void native_p4d_clear(p4d_t *p4d)

static inline void native_set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ *pgdp = pti_set_user_pgd(pgdp, pgd);
+#else
*pgdp = pgd;
+#endif
}

static inline void native_pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 3d27831bc58d..b97a539bcdee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -79,13 +79,17 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
#define MAXMEM _AC(__AC(1, UL) << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS, UL)

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-# define VMALLOC_SIZE_TB _AC(16384, UL)
-# define __VMALLOC_BASE _AC(0xff92000000000000, UL)
+# define VMALLOC_SIZE_TB _AC(12800, UL)
+# define __VMALLOC_BASE _AC(0xffa0000000000000, UL)
# define __VMEMMAP_BASE _AC(0xffd4000000000000, UL)
+# define LDT_PGD_ENTRY _AC(-112, UL)
+# define LDT_BASE_ADDR (LDT_PGD_ENTRY << PGDIR_SHIFT)
#else
# define VMALLOC_SIZE_TB _AC(32, UL)
# define __VMALLOC_BASE _AC(0xffffc90000000000, UL)
# define __VMEMMAP_BASE _AC(0xffffea0000000000, UL)
+# define LDT_PGD_ENTRY _AC(-4, UL)
+# define LDT_BASE_ADDR (LDT_PGD_ENTRY << PGDIR_SHIFT)
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index 43212a43ee69..6a60fea90b9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@
#define CR3_ADDR_MASK __sme_clr(0x7FFFFFFFFFFFF000ull)
#define CR3_PCID_MASK 0xFFFull
#define CR3_NOFLUSH BIT_ULL(63)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+# define X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT 11
+#endif
+
#else
/*
* CR3_ADDR_MASK needs at least bits 31:5 set on PAE systems, and we save
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 9e482d8b0b97..9c18da64daa9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -851,13 +851,22 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)

#else
/*
- * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page. The guard
- * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
- * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
- * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
- * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. We avoid this
- * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
- * at the maximum canonical address.
+ * User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range.
+ * There are a few constraints that determine this:
+ *
+ * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
+ * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
+ * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
+ * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything executable
+ * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
+ *
+ * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
+ * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
+ * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
+ * bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the
+ * Intel problem.
+ *
+ * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
*/
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0b5ef05b2d2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_PTI_H
+#define _ASM_X86_PTI_H
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+extern void pti_init(void);
+extern void pti_check_boottime_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void pti_check_boottime_disable(void) { }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_PTI_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 171b429f43a2..b519da4fc03c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -10,38 +10,90 @@
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/invpcid.h>
+#include <asm/pti.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>

-static inline u64 inc_mm_tlb_gen(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- /*
- * Bump the generation count. This also serves as a full barrier
- * that synchronizes with switch_mm(): callers are required to order
- * their read of mm_cpumask after their writes to the paging
- * structures.
- */
- return atomic64_inc_return(&mm->context.tlb_gen);
-}
+/*
+ * The x86 feature is called PCID (Process Context IDentifier). It is similar
+ * to what is traditionally called ASID on the RISC processors.
+ *
+ * We don't use the traditional ASID implementation, where each process/mm gets
+ * its own ASID and flush/restart when we run out of ASID space.
+ *
+ * Instead we have a small per-cpu array of ASIDs and cache the last few mm's
+ * that came by on this CPU, allowing cheaper switch_mm between processes on
+ * this CPU.
+ *
+ * We end up with different spaces for different things. To avoid confusion we
+ * use different names for each of them:
+ *
+ * ASID - [0, TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS-1]
+ * the canonical identifier for an mm
+ *
+ * kPCID - [1, TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS]
+ * the value we write into the PCID part of CR3; corresponds to the
+ * ASID+1, because PCID 0 is special.
+ *
+ * uPCID - [2048 + 1, 2048 + TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS]
+ * for KPTI each mm has two address spaces and thus needs two
+ * PCID values, but we can still do with a single ASID denomination
+ * for each mm. Corresponds to kPCID + 2048.
+ *
+ */

/* There are 12 bits of space for ASIDS in CR3 */
#define CR3_HW_ASID_BITS 12
+
/*
* When enabled, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
* user/kernel switches
*/
-#define PTI_CONSUMED_ASID_BITS 0
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 1
+#else
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 0
+#endif
+
+#define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS (X86_CR3_PCID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS)

-#define CR3_AVAIL_ASID_BITS (CR3_HW_ASID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_ASID_BITS)
/*
* ASIDs are zero-based: 0->MAX_AVAIL_ASID are valid. -1 below to account
- * for them being zero-based. Another -1 is because ASID 0 is reserved for
+ * for them being zero-based. Another -1 is because PCID 0 is reserved for
* use by non-PCID-aware users.
*/
-#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_ASID_BITS) - 2)
+#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) - 2)

+/*
+ * 6 because 6 should be plenty and struct tlb_state will fit in two cache
+ * lines.
+ */
+#define TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS 6
+
+/*
+ * Given @asid, compute kPCID
+ */
static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
{
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not confict with the
+ * bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+
+ /*
+ * The ASID being passed in here should have respected the
+ * MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE and thus never have the switch bit set.
+ */
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+#endif
/*
+ * The dynamically-assigned ASIDs that get passed in are small
+ * (<TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS). They never have the high switch bit set,
+ * so do not bother to clear it.
+ *
* If PCID is on, ASID-aware code paths put the ASID+1 into the
* PCID bits. This serves two purposes. It prevents a nasty
* situation in which PCID-unaware code saves CR3, loads some other
@@ -53,6 +105,18 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
return asid + 1;
}

+/*
+ * Given @asid, compute uPCID
+ */
+static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
+{
+ u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT;
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
struct pgd_t;
static inline unsigned long build_cr3(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid)
{
@@ -95,12 +159,6 @@ static inline bool tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm(void)
return !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
}

-/*
- * 6 because 6 should be plenty and struct tlb_state will fit in
- * two cache lines.
- */
-#define TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS 6
-
struct tlb_context {
u64 ctx_id;
u64 tlb_gen;
@@ -135,6 +193,24 @@ struct tlb_state {
bool is_lazy;

/*
+ * If set we changed the page tables in such a way that we
+ * needed an invalidation of all contexts (aka. PCIDs / ASIDs).
+ * This tells us to go invalidate all the non-loaded ctxs[]
+ * on the next context switch.
+ *
+ * The current ctx was kept up-to-date as it ran and does not
+ * need to be invalidated.
+ */
+ bool invalidate_other;
+
+ /*
+ * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
+ * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
+ * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
+ */
+ unsigned short user_pcid_flush_mask;
+
+ /*
* Access to this CR4 shadow and to H/W CR4 is protected by
* disabling interrupts when modifying either one.
*/
@@ -212,6 +288,14 @@ static inline unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
}

/*
+ * Mark all other ASIDs as invalid, preserves the current.
+ */
+static inline void invalidate_other_asid(void)
+{
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.invalidate_other, true);
+}
+
+/*
* Save some of cr4 feature set we're using (e.g. Pentium 4MB
* enable and PPro Global page enable), so that any CPU's that boot
* up after us can get the correct flags. This should only be used
@@ -231,14 +315,41 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(unsigned long mask)
extern void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void);

/*
+ * Given an ASID, flush the corresponding user ASID. We can delay this
+ * until the next time we switch to it.
+ *
+ * See SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
+ */
+static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
+{
+ /* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * We only have a single ASID if PCID is off and the CR3
+ * write will have flushed it.
+ */
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ __set_bit(kern_pcid(asid),
+ (unsigned long *)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask));
+}
+
+/*
* flush the entire current user mapping
*/
static inline void __native_flush_tlb(void)
{
+ invalidate_user_asid(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid));
/*
- * If current->mm == NULL then we borrow a mm which may change during a
- * task switch and therefore we must not be preempted while we write CR3
- * back:
+ * If current->mm == NULL then we borrow a mm which may change
+ * during a task switch and therefore we must not be preempted
+ * while we write CR3 back:
*/
preempt_disable();
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
@@ -256,6 +367,8 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void)
/*
* Using INVPCID is considerably faster than a pair of writes
* to CR4 sandwiched inside an IRQ flag save/restore.
+ *
+ * Note, this works with CR4.PCIDE=0 or 1.
*/
invpcid_flush_all();
return;
@@ -282,7 +395,21 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void)
*/
static inline void __native_flush_tlb_single(unsigned long addr)
{
+ u32 loaded_mm_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+
asm volatile("invlpg (%0)" ::"r" (addr) : "memory");
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Some platforms #GP if we call invpcid(type=1/2) before CR4.PCIDE=1.
+ * Just use invalidate_user_asid() in case we are called early.
+ */
+ if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE))
+ invalidate_user_asid(loaded_mm_asid);
+ else
+ invpcid_flush_one(user_pcid(loaded_mm_asid), addr);
}

/*
@@ -298,14 +425,6 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_all(void)
*/
__flush_tlb();
}
-
- /*
- * Note: if we somehow had PCID but not PGE, then this wouldn't work --
- * we'd end up flushing kernel translations for the current ASID but
- * we might fail to flush kernel translations for other cached ASIDs.
- *
- * To avoid this issue, we force PCID off if PGE is off.
- */
}

/*
@@ -315,6 +434,16 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_one(unsigned long addr)
{
count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ONE);
__flush_tlb_single(addr);
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * __flush_tlb_single() will have cleared the TLB entry for this ASID,
+ * but since kernel space is replicated across all, we must also
+ * invalidate all others.
+ */
+ invalidate_other_asid();
}

#define TLB_FLUSH_ALL -1UL
@@ -375,6 +504,17 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long a)
void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
const struct flush_tlb_info *info);

+static inline u64 inc_mm_tlb_gen(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Bump the generation count. This also serves as a full barrier
+ * that synchronizes with switch_mm(): callers are required to order
+ * their read of mm_cpumask after their writes to the paging
+ * structures.
+ */
+ return atomic64_inc_return(&mm->context.tlb_gen);
+}
+
static inline void arch_tlbbatch_add_mm(struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
index d9a7c659009c..b986b2ca688a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
extern void map_vsyscall(void);
+extern void set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root);

/*
* Called on instruction fetch fault in vsyscall page.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index 53b4ca55ebb6..97abdaab9535 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -78,7 +78,12 @@
#define X86_CR3_PWT _BITUL(X86_CR3_PWT_BIT)
#define X86_CR3_PCD_BIT 4 /* Page Cache Disable */
#define X86_CR3_PCD _BITUL(X86_CR3_PCD_BIT)
-#define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK _AC(0x00000fff,UL) /* PCID Mask */
+
+#define X86_CR3_PCID_BITS 12
+#define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK (_AC((1UL << X86_CR3_PCID_BITS) - 1, UL))
+
+#define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT 63 /* Preserve old PCID */
+#define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH _BITULL(X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT)

/*
* Intel CPU features in CR4
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 676b7cf4b62b..76417a9aab73 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/suspend.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>

#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
@@ -94,6 +95,9 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
DEFINE(PTREGS_SIZE, sizeof(struct pt_regs));

+ /* TLB state for the entry code */
+ OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
+
/* Layout info for cpu_entry_area */
OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_tss, cpu_entry_area, tss);
OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_trampoline, cpu_entry_area, entry_trampoline);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 8ddcfa4d4165..f2a94dfb434e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}

setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+
fpu__init_system(c);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -1335,7 +1339,10 @@ void syscall_init(void)
(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline - _entry_trampoline);

wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS);
- wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline);
+ else
+ wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);

#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index 36b17e0febe8..5fa110699ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -297,11 +297,13 @@ int __die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
unsigned long sp;
#endif
printk(KERN_DEFAULT
- "%s: %04lx [#%d]%s%s%s%s\n", str, err & 0xffff, ++die_counter,
+ "%s: %04lx [#%d]%s%s%s%s%s\n", str, err & 0xffff, ++die_counter,
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT) ? " PREEMPT" : "",
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) ? " SMP" : "",
debug_pagealloc_enabled() ? " DEBUG_PAGEALLOC" : "",
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) ? " KASAN" : "");
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) ? " KASAN" : "",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? " PTI" : " NOPTI") : "");

if (notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err,
current->thread.trap_nr, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 7dca675fe78d..04a625f0fcda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -341,6 +341,27 @@ GLOBAL(early_recursion_flag)
.balign PAGE_SIZE; \
GLOBAL(name)

+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/*
+ * Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned. We do not
+ * ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
+ * strictly *need* the second page, but this allows us to
+ * have a single set_pgd() implementation that does not
+ * need to worry about whether it has 4k or 8k to work
+ * with.
+ *
+ * This ensures PGDs are 8k long:
+ */
+#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 512
+/* This ensures they are 8k-aligned: */
+#define NEXT_PGD_PAGE(name) \
+ .balign 2 * PAGE_SIZE; \
+GLOBAL(name)
+#else
+#define NEXT_PGD_PAGE(name) NEXT_PAGE(name)
+#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 0
+#endif
+
/* Automate the creation of 1 to 1 mapping pmd entries */
#define PMDS(START, PERM, COUNT) \
i = 0 ; \
@@ -350,13 +371,14 @@ GLOBAL(name)
.endr

__INITDATA
-NEXT_PAGE(early_top_pgt)
+NEXT_PGD_PAGE(early_top_pgt)
.fill 511,8,0
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
.quad level4_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
#else
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
#endif
+ .fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0

NEXT_PAGE(early_dynamic_pgts)
.fill 512*EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES,8,0
@@ -364,13 +386,14 @@ NEXT_PAGE(early_dynamic_pgts)
.data

#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_PVH)
-NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
+NEXT_PGD_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.org init_top_pgt + PGD_PAGE_OFFSET*8, 0
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.org init_top_pgt + PGD_START_KERNEL*8, 0
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024))/(2^39) = 511 */
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
+ .fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0

NEXT_PAGE(level3_ident_pgt)
.quad level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
@@ -381,8 +404,9 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level2_ident_pgt)
*/
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_IDENT_LARGE_EXEC, PTRS_PER_PMD)
#else
-NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
+NEXT_PGD_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.fill 512,8,0
+ .fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index a6b5d62f45a7..579cc4a66fdf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>

#include <asm/ldt.h>
+#include <asm/tlb.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/syscalls.h>
@@ -51,13 +52,11 @@ static void refresh_ldt_segments(void)
static void flush_ldt(void *__mm)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = __mm;
- mm_context_t *pc;

if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) != mm)
return;

- pc = &mm->context;
- set_ldt(pc->ldt->entries, pc->ldt->nr_entries);
+ load_mm_ldt(mm);

refresh_ldt_segments();
}
@@ -94,10 +93,126 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries)
return NULL;
}

+ /* The new LDT isn't aliased for PTI yet. */
+ new_ldt->slot = -1;
+
new_ldt->nr_entries = num_entries;
return new_ldt;
}

+/*
+ * If PTI is enabled, this maps the LDT into the kernelmode and
+ * usermode tables for the given mm.
+ *
+ * There is no corresponding unmap function. Even if the LDT is freed, we
+ * leave the PTEs around until the slot is reused or the mm is destroyed.
+ * This is harmless: the LDT is always in ordinary memory, and no one will
+ * access the freed slot.
+ *
+ * If we wanted to unmap freed LDTs, we'd also need to do a flush to make
+ * it useful, and the flush would slow down modify_ldt().
+ */
+static int
+map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ bool is_vmalloc, had_top_level_entry;
+ unsigned long va;
+ spinlock_t *ptl;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Any given ldt_struct should have map_ldt_struct() called at most
+ * once.
+ */
+ WARN_ON(ldt->slot != -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Did we already have the top level entry allocated? We can't
+ * use pgd_none() for this because it doens't do anything on
+ * 4-level page table kernels.
+ */
+ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR);
+ had_top_level_entry = (pgd->pgd != 0);
+
+ is_vmalloc = is_vmalloc_addr(ldt->entries);
+
+ for (i = 0; i * PAGE_SIZE < ldt->nr_entries * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE; i++) {
+ unsigned long offset = i << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ const void *src = (char *)ldt->entries + offset;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ pte_t pte, *ptep;
+
+ va = (unsigned long)ldt_slot_va(slot) + offset;
+ pfn = is_vmalloc ? vmalloc_to_pfn(src) :
+ page_to_pfn(virt_to_page(src));
+ /*
+ * Treat the PTI LDT range as a *userspace* range.
+ * get_locked_pte() will allocate all needed pagetables
+ * and account for them in this mm.
+ */
+ ptep = get_locked_pte(mm, va, &ptl);
+ if (!ptep)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * Map it RO so the easy to find address is not a primary
+ * target via some kernel interface which misses a
+ * permission check.
+ */
+ pte = pfn_pte(pfn, __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL));
+ set_pte_at(mm, va, ptep, pte);
+ pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
+ }
+
+ if (mm->context.ldt) {
+ /*
+ * We already had an LDT. The top-level entry should already
+ * have been allocated and synchronized with the usermode
+ * tables.
+ */
+ WARN_ON(!had_top_level_entry);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ WARN_ON(!kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd)->pgd);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This is the first time we're mapping an LDT for this process.
+ * Sync the pgd to the usermode tables.
+ */
+ WARN_ON(had_top_level_entry);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
+ WARN_ON(kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd)->pgd);
+ set_pgd(kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd), *pgd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ va = (unsigned long)ldt_slot_va(slot);
+ flush_tlb_mm_range(mm, va, va + LDT_SLOT_STRIDE, 0);
+
+ ldt->slot = slot;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void free_ldt_pgtables(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+ unsigned long start = LDT_BASE_ADDR;
+ unsigned long end = start + (1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT);
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end);
+ free_pgd_range(&tlb, start, end, start, end);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end);
+#endif
+}
+
/* After calling this, the LDT is immutable. */
static void finalize_ldt_struct(struct ldt_struct *ldt)
{
@@ -156,6 +271,12 @@ int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *old_mm, struct mm_struct *mm)
new_ldt->nr_entries * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE);
finalize_ldt_struct(new_ldt);

+ retval = map_ldt_struct(mm, new_ldt, 0);
+ if (retval) {
+ free_ldt_pgtables(mm);
+ free_ldt_struct(new_ldt);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
mm->context.ldt = new_ldt;

out_unlock:
@@ -174,6 +295,11 @@ void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
mm->context.ldt = NULL;
}

+void ldt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ free_ldt_pgtables(mm);
+}
+
static int read_ldt(void __user *ptr, unsigned long bytecount)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -287,6 +413,18 @@ static int write_ldt(void __user *ptr, unsigned long bytecount, int oldmode)
new_ldt->entries[ldt_info.entry_number] = ldt;
finalize_ldt_struct(new_ldt);

+ /*
+ * If we are using PTI, map the new LDT into the userspace pagetables.
+ * If there is already an LDT, use the other slot so that other CPUs
+ * will continue to use the old LDT until install_ldt() switches
+ * them over to the new LDT.
+ */
+ error = map_ldt_struct(mm, new_ldt, old_ldt ? !old_ldt->slot : 0);
+ if (error) {
+ free_ldt_struct(old_ldt);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
install_ldt(mm, new_ldt);
free_ldt_struct(old_ldt);
error = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index 9a9c9b076955..a5b802a12212 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -93,17 +93,10 @@ static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
cpu = get_cpu();

while (n-- > 0) {
- if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info)) {
+ if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
- } else {
+ else
fill_ldt(desc, info);
-
- /*
- * Always set the accessed bit so that the CPU
- * doesn't try to write to the (read-only) GDT.
- */
- desc->type |= 1;
- }
++info;
++desc;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index d2a8b5a24a44..1e413a9326aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -61,11 +61,17 @@ jiffies_64 = jiffies;
. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE); \
__end_rodata_hpage_align = .;

+#define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE);
+#define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE);
+
#else

#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END

+#define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN
+#define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
+
#endif

PHDRS {
@@ -102,8 +108,10 @@ SECTIONS
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT
KPROBES_TEXT
+ ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN
ENTRY_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
+ ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
*(.fixup)
*(.gnu.warning)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 2e0017af8f9b..52906808e277 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -43,9 +43,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_NUMA) += amdtopology.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += srat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o

-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o

obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index fe814fd5e014..b9283cc27622 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -38,6 +38,32 @@ cea_map_percpu_pages(void *cea_vaddr, void *ptr, int pages, pgprot_t prot)
cea_set_pte(cea_vaddr, per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr), prot);
}

+static void percpu_setup_debug_store(int cpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ int npages;
+ void *cea;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ return;
+
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_store;
+ npages = sizeof(struct debug_store) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct debug_store) % PAGE_SIZE != 0);
+ cea_map_percpu_pages(cea, &per_cpu(cpu_debug_store, cpu), npages,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+ cea = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->cpu_debug_buffers;
+ /*
+ * Force the population of PMDs for not yet allocated per cpu
+ * memory like debug store buffers.
+ */
+ npages = sizeof(struct debug_store_buffers) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ for (; npages; npages--, cea += PAGE_SIZE)
+ cea_set_pte(cea, 0, PAGE_NONE);
+#endif
+}
+
/* Setup the fixmap mappings only once per-processor */
static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
{
@@ -109,6 +135,7 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
cea_set_pte(&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline,
__pa_symbol(_entry_trampoline), PAGE_KERNEL_RX);
#endif
+ percpu_setup_debug_store(cpu);
}

static __init void setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
index bfcffdf6c577..421f2664ffa0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@

static int ptdump_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
- ptdump_walk_pgd_level(m, NULL);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(m, NULL, false);
return 0;
}

@@ -22,21 +22,89 @@ static const struct file_operations ptdump_fops = {
.release = single_release,
};

-static struct dentry *pe;
+static int ptdump_show_curknl(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ if (current->mm->pgd) {
+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(m, current->mm->pgd, false);
+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ptdump_open_curknl(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ return single_open(filp, ptdump_show_curknl, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ptdump_curknl_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = ptdump_open_curknl,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+static struct dentry *pe_curusr;
+
+static int ptdump_show_curusr(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ if (current->mm->pgd) {
+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(m, current->mm->pgd, true);
+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ptdump_open_curusr(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ return single_open(filp, ptdump_show_curusr, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ptdump_curusr_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = ptdump_open_curusr,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static struct dentry *dir, *pe_knl, *pe_curknl;

static int __init pt_dump_debug_init(void)
{
- pe = debugfs_create_file("kernel_page_tables", S_IRUSR, NULL, NULL,
- &ptdump_fops);
- if (!pe)
+ dir = debugfs_create_dir("page_tables", NULL);
+ if (!dir)
return -ENOMEM;

+ pe_knl = debugfs_create_file("kernel", 0400, dir, NULL,
+ &ptdump_fops);
+ if (!pe_knl)
+ goto err;
+
+ pe_curknl = debugfs_create_file("current_kernel", 0400,
+ dir, NULL, &ptdump_curknl_fops);
+ if (!pe_curknl)
+ goto err;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ pe_curusr = debugfs_create_file("current_user", 0400,
+ dir, NULL, &ptdump_curusr_fops);
+ if (!pe_curusr)
+ goto err;
+#endif
return 0;
+err:
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(dir);
+ return -ENOMEM;
}

static void __exit pt_dump_debug_exit(void)
{
- debugfs_remove_recursive(pe);
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(dir);
}

module_init(pt_dump_debug_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 43dedbfb7257..f56902c1f04b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -52,12 +52,18 @@ enum address_markers_idx {
USER_SPACE_NR = 0,
KERNEL_SPACE_NR,
LOW_KERNEL_NR,
+#if defined(CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL) && defined(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)
+ LDT_NR,
+#endif
VMALLOC_START_NR,
VMEMMAP_START_NR,
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
KASAN_SHADOW_START_NR,
KASAN_SHADOW_END_NR,
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)
+ LDT_NR,
+#endif
CPU_ENTRY_AREA_NR,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
ESPFIX_START_NR,
@@ -82,6 +88,9 @@ static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = {
[KASAN_SHADOW_START_NR] = { KASAN_SHADOW_START, "KASAN shadow" },
[KASAN_SHADOW_END_NR] = { KASAN_SHADOW_END, "KASAN shadow end" },
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+ [LDT_NR] = { LDT_BASE_ADDR, "LDT remap" },
+#endif
[CPU_ENTRY_AREA_NR] = { CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE,"CPU entry Area" },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
[ESPFIX_START_NR] = { ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR, "ESPfix Area", 16 },
@@ -467,7 +476,7 @@ static inline bool is_hypervisor_range(int idx)
}

static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd,
- bool checkwx)
+ bool checkwx, bool dmesg)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pgd_t *start = (pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt;
@@ -480,7 +489,7 @@ static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd,

if (pgd) {
start = pgd;
- st.to_dmesg = true;
+ st.to_dmesg = dmesg;
}

st.check_wx = checkwx;
@@ -518,13 +527,37 @@ static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd,

void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd)
{
- ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(m, pgd, false);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(m, pgd, false, true);
+}
+
+void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd, bool user)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ if (user && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
+#endif
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(m, pgd, false, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs);
+
+static void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ pgd_t *pgd = (pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("x86/mm: Checking user space page tables\n");
+ pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, pgd, true, false);
+#endif
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level);

void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
{
- ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, NULL, true);
+ ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, NULL, true, false);
+ ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx();
}

static int __init pt_dump_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index a22c2b95e513..80259ad8c386 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <asm/kaslr.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/pti.h>

/*
* We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c
@@ -161,6 +162,12 @@ struct map_range {

static int page_size_mask;

+static void enable_global_pages(void)
+{
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_GLOBAL;
+}
+
static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void)
{
/*
@@ -179,11 +186,11 @@ static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void)
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PSE);

/* Enable PGE if available */
+ __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot(X86_CR4_PGE);
- __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_GLOBAL;
- } else
- __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+ enable_global_pages();
+ }

/* Enable 1 GB linear kernel mappings if available: */
if (direct_gbpages && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES)) {
@@ -196,34 +203,44 @@ static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void)

static void setup_pcid(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
- /*
- * This can't be cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() --
- * the trampoline code can't handle CR4.PCIDE and
- * it wouldn't do any good anyway. Despite the name,
- * cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() doesn't actually
- * cause the bits in question to remain set all the
- * way through the secondary boot asm.
- *
- * Instead, we brute-force it and set CR4.PCIDE
- * manually in start_secondary().
- */
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
- } else {
- /*
- * flush_tlb_all(), as currently implemented, won't
- * work if PCID is on but PGE is not. Since that
- * combination doesn't exist on real hardware, there's
- * no reason to try to fully support it, but it's
- * polite to avoid corrupting data if we're on
- * an improperly configured VM.
- */
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
- }
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
+ /*
+ * This can't be cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() -- the
+ * trampoline code can't handle CR4.PCIDE and it wouldn't
+ * do any good anyway. Despite the name,
+ * cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() doesn't actually cause
+ * the bits in question to remain set all the way through
+ * the secondary boot asm.
+ *
+ * Instead, we brute-force it and set CR4.PCIDE manually in
+ * start_secondary().
+ */
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+ /*
+ * INVPCID's single-context modes (2/3) only work if we set
+ * X86_CR4_PCIDE, *and* we INVPCID support. It's unusable
+ * on systems that have X86_CR4_PCIDE clear, or that have
+ * no INVPCID support at all.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * flush_tlb_all(), as currently implemented, won't work if
+ * PCID is on but PGE is not. Since that combination
+ * doesn't exist on real hardware, there's no reason to try
+ * to fully support it, but it's polite to avoid corrupting
+ * data if we're on an improperly configured VM.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
}
-#endif
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -624,6 +641,7 @@ void __init init_mem_mapping(void)
{
unsigned long end;

+ pti_check_boottime_disable();
probe_page_size_mask();
setup_pcid();

@@ -847,7 +865,7 @@ void __init zone_sizes_init(void)
free_area_init_nodes(max_zone_pfns);
}

-DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) = {
+__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) = {
.loaded_mm = &init_mm,
.next_asid = 1,
.cr4 = ~0UL, /* fail hard if we screw up cr4 shadow initialization */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 17ebc5a978cc..9b7bcbd33cc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -355,14 +355,15 @@ static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd)
kmem_cache_free(pgd_cache, pgd);
}
#else
+
static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void)
{
- return (pgd_t *)__get_free_page(PGALLOC_GFP);
+ return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(PGALLOC_GFP, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
}

static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd)
{
- free_page((unsigned long)pgd);
+ free_pages((unsigned long)pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_PAE */

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bce8aea65606
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * This code is based in part on work published here:
+ *
+ * https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
+ *
+ * The original work was written by and and signed off by for the Linux
+ * kernel by:
+ *
+ * Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * Major changes to the original code by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
+ * Mostly rewritten by Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> and
+ * Andy Lutomirsky <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/pti.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
+
+/* Backporting helper */
+#ifndef __GFP_NOTRACK
+#define __GFP_NOTRACK 0
+#endif
+
+static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
+{
+ char arg[5];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV)) {
+ pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on XEN PV.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "pti", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ if (ret == 3 && !strncmp(arg, "off", 3)) {
+ pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ret == 2 && !strncmp(arg, "on", 2)) {
+ pti_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+ goto enable;
+ }
+ if (ret == 4 && !strncmp(arg, "auto", 4))
+ goto autosel;
+ }
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+ pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+autosel:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ return;
+enable:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
+}
+
+pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Changes to the high (kernel) portion of the kernelmode page
+ * tables are not automatically propagated to the usermode tables.
+ *
+ * Users should keep in mind that, unlike the kernelmode tables,
+ * there is no vmalloc_fault equivalent for the usermode tables.
+ * Top-level entries added to init_mm's usermode pgd after boot
+ * will not be automatically propagated to other mms.
+ */
+ if (!pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp))
+ return pgd;
+
+ /*
+ * The user page tables get the full PGD, accessible from
+ * userspace:
+ */
+ kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is normal user memory, make it NX in the kernel
+ * pagetables so that, if we somehow screw up and return to
+ * usermode with the kernel CR3 loaded, we'll get a page fault
+ * instead of allowing user code to execute with the wrong CR3.
+ *
+ * As exceptions, we don't set NX if:
+ * - _PAGE_USER is not set. This could be an executable
+ * EFI runtime mapping or something similar, and the kernel
+ * may execute from it
+ * - we don't have NX support
+ * - we're clearing the PGD (i.e. the new pgd is not present).
+ */
+ if ((pgd.pgd & (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT)) == (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT) &&
+ (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
+ pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+ /* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
+ return pgd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
+ gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+ if (address < PAGE_OFFSET) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk user address\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+ unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (!new_p4d_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
+ new_p4d_page = 0;
+ }
+ if (new_p4d_page)
+ free_page(new_p4d_page);
+ }
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
+
+ return p4d_offset(pgd, address);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+{
+ gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+ p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
+ pud_t *pud;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_large(*p4d) != 0);
+ if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+ unsigned long new_pud_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (!new_pud_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+ set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
+ new_pud_page = 0;
+ }
+ if (new_pud_page)
+ free_page(new_pud_page);
+ }
+
+ pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
+ /* The user page tables do not use large mappings: */
+ if (pud_large(*pud)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+ unsigned long new_pmd_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (!new_pmd_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+ set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
+ new_pmd_page = 0;
+ }
+ if (new_pmd_page)
+ free_page(new_pmd_page);
+ }
+
+ return pmd_offset(pud, address);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
+/*
+ * Walk the shadow copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down. Does not support large pages.
+ *
+ * Note: this is only used when mapping *new* kernel data into the
+ * user/shadow page tables. It is never used for userspace data.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a PTE on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address)
+{
+ gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+ pmd_t *pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(address);
+ pte_t *pte;
+
+ /* We can't do anything sensible if we hit a large mapping. */
+ if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+ unsigned long new_pte_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (!new_pte_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
+ new_pte_page = 0;
+ }
+ if (new_pte_page)
+ free_page(new_pte_page);
+ }
+
+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
+ if (pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_USER) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk to user pte\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pte;
+}
+
+static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void)
+{
+ pte_t *pte, *target_pte;
+ unsigned int level;
+
+ pte = lookup_address(VSYSCALL_ADDR, &level);
+ if (!pte || WARN_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K) || pte_none(*pte))
+ return;
+
+ target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(VSYSCALL_ADDR);
+ if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
+ return;
+
+ *target_pte = *pte;
+ set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(kernel_to_user_pgdp(swapper_pg_dir));
+}
+#else
+static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) { }
+#endif
+
+static void __init
+pti_clone_pmds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pmdval_t clear)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Clone the populated PMDs which cover start to end. These PMD areas
+ * can have holes.
+ */
+ for (addr = start; addr < end; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
+ pmd_t *pmd, *target_pmd;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+ p4d_t *p4d;
+ pud_t *pud;
+
+ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+ if (WARN_ON(pgd_none(*pgd)))
+ return;
+ p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+ if (WARN_ON(p4d_none(*p4d)))
+ return;
+ pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+ if (pud_none(*pud))
+ continue;
+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+ if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+ continue;
+
+ target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr);
+ if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the PMD. That is, the kernelmode and usermode
+ * tables will share the last-level page tables of this
+ * address range
+ */
+ *target_pmd = pmd_clear_flags(*pmd, clear);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone a single p4d (i.e. a top-level entry on 4-level systems and a
+ * next-level entry on 5-level systems.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_p4d(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ p4d_t *kernel_p4d, *user_p4d;
+ pgd_t *kernel_pgd;
+
+ user_p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(addr);
+ kernel_pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+ kernel_p4d = p4d_offset(kernel_pgd, addr);
+ *user_p4d = *kernel_p4d;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone the CPU_ENTRY_AREA into the user space visible page table.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
+{
+ pti_clone_p4d(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone the ESPFIX P4D into the user space visinble page table
+ */
+static void __init pti_setup_espfix64(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
+ pti_clone_p4d(ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone the populated PMDs of the entry and irqentry text and force it RO.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_entry_text(void)
+{
+ pti_clone_pmds((unsigned long) __entry_text_start,
+ (unsigned long) __irqentry_text_end, _PAGE_RW);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize kernel page table isolation
+ */
+void __init pti_init(void)
+{
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("enabled\n");
+
+ pti_clone_user_shared();
+ pti_clone_entry_text();
+ pti_setup_espfix64();
+ pti_setup_vsyscall();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 0a1be3adc97e..a1561957dccb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -28,6 +28,38 @@
* Implement flush IPI by CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, Alex Shi
*/

+/*
+ * We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation
+ * but could not go invalidate all of the contexts. We do the
+ * necessary invalidation by clearing out the 'ctx_id' which
+ * forces a TLB flush when the context is loaded.
+ */
+void clear_asid_other(void)
+{
+ u16 asid;
+
+ /*
+ * This is only expected to be set if we have disabled
+ * kernel _PAGE_GLOBAL pages.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (asid = 0; asid < TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS; asid++) {
+ /* Do not need to flush the current asid */
+ if (asid == this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Make sure the next time we go to switch to
+ * this asid, we do a flush:
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].ctx_id, 0);
+ }
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.invalidate_other, false);
+}
+
atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(1);


@@ -42,6 +74,9 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
return;
}

+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.invalidate_other))
+ clear_asid_other();
+
for (asid = 0; asid < TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS; asid++) {
if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].ctx_id) !=
next->context.ctx_id)
@@ -65,6 +100,25 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
*need_flush = true;
}

+static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, bool need_flush)
+{
+ unsigned long new_mm_cr3;
+
+ if (need_flush) {
+ invalidate_user_asid(new_asid);
+ new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3(pgdir, new_asid);
+ } else {
+ new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3_noflush(pgdir, new_asid);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Caution: many callers of this function expect
+ * that load_cr3() is serializing and orders TLB
+ * fills with respect to the mm_cpumask writes.
+ */
+ write_cr3(new_mm_cr3);
+}
+
void leave_mm(int cpu)
{
struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
@@ -195,7 +249,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
if (need_flush) {
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].tlb_gen, next_tlb_gen);
- write_cr3(build_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid));
+ load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, true);

/*
* NB: This gets called via leave_mm() in the idle path
@@ -208,7 +262,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
} else {
/* The new ASID is already up to date. */
- write_cr3(build_cr3_noflush(next->pgd, new_asid));
+ load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, false);

/* See above wrt _rcuidle. */
trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 20fb31579b69..39c4b35ac7a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ static pgd_t *efi_pgd;
* because we want to avoid inserting EFI region mappings (EFI_VA_END
* to EFI_VA_START) into the standard kernel page tables. Everything
* else can be shared, see efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings().
+ *
+ * We don't want the pgd on the pgd_list and cannot use pgd_alloc() for the
+ * allocation.
*/
int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
{
@@ -207,7 +210,7 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
return 0;

gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO;
- efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_page(gfp_mask);
+ efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
if (!efi_pgd)
return -ENOMEM;

diff --git a/include/linux/pti.h b/include/linux/pti.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0174883a935a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/pti.h
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef _INCLUDE_PTI_H
+#define _INCLUDE_PTI_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#include <asm/pti.h>
+#else
+static inline void pti_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 8a390f60ec81..b32ec72cdf3d 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/pti.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/elevator.h>
#include <linux/sched_clock.h>
@@ -506,6 +507,8 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
ioremap_huge_init();
/* Should be run before the first non-init thread is created */
init_espfix_bsp();
+ /* Should be run after espfix64 is set up. */
+ pti_init();
}

asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e8e449444e65..a623d13bf288 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -54,6 +54,16 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
implement socket and networking access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

+config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
+ depends on X86_64 && !UML
+ help
+ This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+ ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
+ into userspace.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details.
+
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c
index 0304ffb714f2..1aef72df20a1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/ldt_gdt.c
@@ -122,8 +122,7 @@ static void check_valid_segment(uint16_t index, int ldt,
* NB: Different Linux versions do different things with the
* accessed bit in set_thread_area().
*/
- if (ar != expected_ar &&
- (ldt || ar != (expected_ar | AR_ACCESSED))) {
+ if (ar != expected_ar && ar != (expected_ar | AR_ACCESSED)) {
printf("[FAIL]\t%s entry %hu has AR 0x%08X but expected 0x%08X\n",
(ldt ? "LDT" : "GDT"), index, ar, expected_ar);
nerrs++;