Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
From: Matthew Garrett
Date: Tue Apr 03 2018 - 18:51:51 EST
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 3:46 PM Linus Torvalds
> For example, I love signed kernel modules. The fact that I love them
> has absolutely zero to do with secure boot, though. There is
> absolutely no linkage between the two issues: I use (self-)signed
> kernel modules simply because I think it's a good thing in general.
> The same thing is true of some lockdown patch. Maybe it's a good thing
> in general. But whether it's a good thing is _entirely_ independent of
> any secure boot issue. I can see using secure boot without it, but I
> can very much also see using lockdown without secure boot.
> The two things are simply entirely orthogonal. They have _zero_
> overlap. I'm not seeing why they'd be linked at all in any way.
Lockdown is clearly useful without Secure Boot (and I intend to deploy it
that way for various things), but I still don't understand why you feel
that the common case of booting a kernel from a boot chain that's widely
trusted derives no benefit from it being harder to subvert that kernel into
subverting that boot chain. For cases where you're self-signing and feel
happy about that, you just set CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT to n and