Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Wed Apr 04 2018 - 09:02:42 EST
On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 08:57:43AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 04:30:18AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > What I'm afraid of is this turning into a "security" feature that ends up
> > being circumvented in most scenarios where it's currently deployed - eg,
> > module signatures are mostly worthless in the non-lockdown case because you
> > can just grab the sig_enforce symbol address and then kexec a preamble that
> > flips it back to N regardless of the kernel config.
> Whoa. Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec? Put another away, why
> isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
> used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?
Because no one is afraid of that :)