[PATCH 4.9 30/66] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Apr 17 2018 - 12:25:10 EST

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>

commit 30d88c0e3ace625a92eead9ca0ad94093a8f59fe upstream.

It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx> [v4.9 backport]
Tested-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 +++++
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -686,6 +686,11 @@ el0_irq_naked:

+ tbz x22, #55, 1f
+ bl do_el0_irq_bp_hardening

--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -590,6 +590,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort
arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);

+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+ /* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+ arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)