[PATCH 28/39] x86/mm/pti: Keep permissions when cloning kernel text in pti_clone_kernel_text()

[Joerg Roedel]

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>

Mapping the kernel text area to user-space makes only sense
if it has the same permissions as in the kernel page-table.
If permissions are different this will cause a TLB reload
when using the kernel page-table, which is as good as not
mapping it at all.

On 64-bit kernels this patch makes no difference, as the
whole range cloned by pti_clone_kernel_text() is mapped RO
anyway. On 32 bit there are writeable mappings in the range,
so just keep the permissions as they are.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 4f6e933..fc77054 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ void pti_clone_kernel_text(void)
 	 * pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() did to clear the
 	 * global bit.
 	 */
-	pti_clone_pmds(start, end, _PAGE_RW);
+	pti_clone_pmds(start, end, 0);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.7.4