Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption
From: Pavel Machek
Date: Tue Jul 24 2018 - 08:05:46 EST
> > > Yes. But you are objecting to encryption in kernel space at all,
> > > aren't you?
> > I don't particulary love the idea of doing hibernation encryption in
> > the kernel, correct.
> > But we have this weird thing called secure boot, some people seem to
> > want. So we may need some crypto in the kernel -- but I'd like
> > something that works with uswsusp, too. Plus, it is mandatory that
> > patch explains what security guarantees they want to provide against
> > what kinds of attacks...
> > Lee, Chun-Yi's patch seemed more promising. Pavel
> The only difference between Chun-Yi's hibernation encrytion solution
> and our solution is that his strategy encrypts the snapshot from sratch,
> and ours encryts each page before them going to block device. The benefit
> of his solution is that the snapshot can be encrypt in kernel first
> thus the uswsusp is allowed to read it to user space even kernel
> is lock down. And I had a discussion with Chun-Yi that we can use
> his snapshot solution to make uswsusp happy, and we share the crypto
> help code and he can also use our user provided key for his signature.
> >From this point of view, our code are actually the same, except that
> we can help clean up the code and also enhance some encrytion process
> for his solution. I don't know why you don't like encryption in kernel,
> because from my point of view, without encryption hibernation in kernel,
> uswsusp could not be enabled if kernel is lock down : -) Or do I miss something?
We can do encryption in kernel if really needed, but I don't have to
like it, do I? :-).
I understand what Chun-Yi's code is trying to do. I can't say the same
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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