Re: TLB flushes on fixmap changes
From: Nadav Amit
Date: Sun Aug 26 2018 - 01:54:23 EST
at 9:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 9:21 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 7:23 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Fri, 24 Aug 2018 21:23:26 -0700
>>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> Couldn't text_poke() use kmap_atomic()? Or, even better, just change CR3?
>>> No, since kmap_atomic() is only for x86_32 and highmem support kernel.
>>> In x86-64, it seems that returns just a page address. That is not
>>> good for text_poke, since it needs to make a writable alias for RO
>>> code page. Hmm, maybe, can we mimic copy_oldmem_page(), it uses ioremap_cache?
>> I just re-read text_poke(). It's, um, horrible. Not only is the
>> implementation overcomplicated and probably buggy, but it's SLOOOOOW.
>> It's totally the wrong API -- poking one instruction at a time
>> basically can't be efficient on x86. The API should either poke lots
>> of instructions at once or should be text_poke_begin(); ...;
>> Anyway, the attached patch seems to boot. Linus, Kees, etc: is this
>> too scary of an approach? With the patch applied, text_poke() is a
>> fantastic exploit target. On the other hand, even without the patch
>> applied, text_poke() is every bit as juicy.
> I tried to convince Ingo to use this method for doing "write rarely"
> and he soundly rejected it. :) I've always liked this because AFAICT,
> it's local to the CPU. I had proposed it in
> With that, text_poke() mostly becomes:
> memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
> As for juiciness, if an attacker already has execution control, they
> can do more interesting things than text_poke(). But regardless, yes,
> it's always made me uncomfortable. :)
I think that the key to harden the security of text_poke() against its use
as a gadget in a ROP/JOP attack is to add a check/assertion for the old
(expected) value, such as:
if (*addr == prev_opcode)
memcpy(addr, opcode, len);