Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
From: Yu-cheng Yu
Date: Thu Aug 30 2018 - 13:30:31 EST
On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 10:19 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 08/30/2018 09:23 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > Three threads (A, B, C) run with the same CR3.
> > 1. a dirty+writable PTE is placed directly in front of B's shadow
> > stack.
> > ÂÂÂ(this can happen, right? or is there a guard page?)
> > 2. C's TLB caches the dirty+writable PTE.
> > 3. A performs some syscall that triggers ptep_set_wrprotect().
> > 4. A's syscall calls clear_bit().
> > 5. B's TLB caches the transient shadow stack.
> > [now C has write access to B's transiently-extended shadow stack]
> > 6. B recurses into the transiently-extended shadow stack
> > 7. C overwrites the transiently-extended shadow stack area.
> > 8. B returns through the transiently-extended shadow stack, giving
> > ÂÂÂÂthe attacker instruction pointer control in B.
> > 9. A's syscall broadcasts a TLB flush.
> Heh, that's a good point.ÂÂThe shadow stack permissions are *not*
> strictly reduced because a page getting marked as shadow-stack has
> *increased* permissions when being used as a shadow stack.ÂÂFun.
> For general hardening, it seems like we want to ensure that there's
> guard page at the bottom of the shadow stack.ÂÂYu-cheng, do we have
> guard page?
We don't have the guard page now, but there is a shadow stack token
there, which cannot be used as a return address.