[PATCH v7 3/3] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs

[Jiri Kosina]

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx>

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, we're filling RSB on context 
switch in order to protect from various classess of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 53eb14a65610..fe32103fcdc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
-		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 			       (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
+			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
 			       spectre_v2_module_string());
 		return ret;
 
-- 
2.12.3


-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs