[PATCH 3.16 213/366] vt: prevent leaking uninitialized data to userspace via /dev/vcs*

From: Ben Hutchings
Date: Sun Nov 11 2018 - 15:00:09 EST


3.16.61-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 21eff69aaaa0e766ca0ce445b477698dc6a9f55a upstream.

KMSAN reported an infoleak when reading from /dev/vcs*:

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in vcs_read+0x18ba/0x1cc0
Call Trace:
...
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1253
copy_to_user ./include/linux/uaccess.h:184
vcs_read+0x18ba/0x1cc0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:352
__vfs_read+0x1b2/0x9d0 fs/read_write.c:416
vfs_read+0x36c/0x6b0 fs/read_write.c:452
...
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
__kmalloc+0x13a/0x350 mm/slub.c:3818
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:517
vc_allocate+0x438/0x800 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:787
con_install+0x8c/0x640 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:2880
tty_driver_install_tty drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1224
tty_init_dev+0x1b5/0x1020 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1324
tty_open_by_driver drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1959
tty_open+0x17b4/0x2ed0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2007
chrdev_open+0xc25/0xd90 fs/char_dev.c:417
do_dentry_open+0xccc/0x1440 fs/open.c:794
vfs_open+0x1b6/0x2f0 fs/open.c:908
...
Bytes 0-79 of 240 are uninitialized

Consistently allocating |vc_screenbuf| with kzalloc() fixes the problem

Reported-by: syzbot+17a8efdf800000@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ int vc_allocate(unsigned int currcons) /
if (!*vc->vc_uni_pagedir_loc)
con_set_default_unimap(vc);

- vc->vc_screenbuf = kmalloc(vc->vc_screenbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vc->vc_screenbuf = kzalloc(vc->vc_screenbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vc->vc_screenbuf)
goto err_free;

@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struc

if (new_screen_size > (4 << 20))
return -EINVAL;
- newscreen = kmalloc(new_screen_size, GFP_USER);
+ newscreen = kzalloc(new_screen_size, GFP_USER);
if (!newscreen)
return -ENOMEM;