Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] ima: fix build error redeclaration of enumerator

From: James Morris
Date: Fri Feb 15 2019 - 17:32:47 EST

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In reply to: Mimi Zohar: "Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] ima: fix build error redeclaration of enumerator"
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On Thu, 14 Feb 2019, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> Ok, this looks reasonable, but will have a minor clash with Gustavo's
> "security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing
> break".
>
> James, are you picking up Gastavo's v2 patch from Friday?

Nope.

>
> Mimi
>
> > ---
> >
> > No change since v2.
> >
> > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 24 +++----
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 3 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 40 ++++++------
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 ++++-----
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 92 +++++++++++++--------------
> > 5 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > index d213e835c498..89ceb61f279c 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > @@ -173,18 +173,18 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
> > }
> >
> > #define __ima_hooks(hook) \
> > - hook(NONE) \
> > - hook(FILE_CHECK) \
> > - hook(MMAP_CHECK) \
> > - hook(BPRM_CHECK) \
> > - hook(CREDS_CHECK) \
> > - hook(POST_SETATTR) \
> > - hook(MODULE_CHECK) \
> > - hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \
> > - hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
> > - hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
> > - hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
> > - hook(MAX_CHECK)
> > + hook(IMA_NONE) \
> > + hook(IMA_FILE_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_MMAP_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_BPRM_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_CREDS_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_POST_SETATTR) \
> > + hook(IMA_MODULE_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_POLICY_CHECK) \
> > + hook(IMA_MAX_CHECK)
> > #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
> >
> > enum ima_hooks {
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > index c7505fb122d4..81e705423894 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> > * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
> > * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> > * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
> > - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> > + * func: IMA_FILE_CHECK | IMA_BPRM_CHECK | IMA_CREDS_CHECK \
> > + * | IMA_MMAP_CHECK | IMA_MODULE_CHECK
> > * mask: contains the permission mask
> > * fsmagic: hex value
> > *
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > index a2baa85ea2f5..c527cf3f37d3 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -86,16 +86,16 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > enum ima_hooks func)
> > {
> > switch (func) {
> > - case MMAP_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_MMAP_CHECK:
> > return iint->ima_mmap_status;
> > - case BPRM_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_BPRM_CHECK:
> > return iint->ima_bprm_status;
> > - case CREDS_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_CREDS_CHECK:
> > return iint->ima_creds_status;
> > - case FILE_CHECK:
> > - case POST_SETATTR:
> > + case IMA_FILE_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_POST_SETATTR:
> > return iint->ima_file_status;
> > - case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > + case IMA_MODULE_CHECK ... IMA_MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > default:
> > return iint->ima_read_status;
> > }
> > @@ -106,19 +106,19 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > enum integrity_status status)
> > {
> > switch (func) {
> > - case MMAP_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_MMAP_CHECK:
> > iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
> > break;
> > - case BPRM_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_BPRM_CHECK:
> > iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
> > break;
> > - case CREDS_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_CREDS_CHECK:
> > iint->ima_creds_status = status;
> > - case FILE_CHECK:
> > - case POST_SETATTR:
> > + case IMA_FILE_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_POST_SETATTR:
> > iint->ima_file_status = status;
> > break;
> > - case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > + case IMA_MODULE_CHECK ... IMA_MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > default:
> > iint->ima_read_status = status;
> > break;
> > @@ -129,20 +129,20 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > enum ima_hooks func)
> > {
> > switch (func) {
> > - case MMAP_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_MMAP_CHECK:
> > iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > break;
> > - case BPRM_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_BPRM_CHECK:
> > iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > break;
> > - case CREDS_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_CREDS_CHECK:
> > iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > break;
> > - case FILE_CHECK:
> > - case POST_SETATTR:
> > + case IMA_FILE_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_POST_SETATTR:
> > iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > break;
> > - case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > + case IMA_MODULE_CHECK ... IMA_MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > default:
> > iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > break;
> > @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> > break;
> > }
> > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
> > - func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> > + func == IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> > rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
> > (const char *)xattr_value,
> > xattr_len,
> > @@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
> > || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> > return;
> >
> > - action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
> > + action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, IMA_POST_SETATTR);
> > if (!action)
> > __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
> > iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 357edd140c09..1ddbe39cba8a 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> > * Included is the appraise submask.
> > */
> > action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
> > - violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
> > + violation_check = ((func == IMA_FILE_CHECK || func == IMA_MMAP_CHECK) &&
> > (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
> > if (!action && !violation_check)
> > return 0;
> > @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> >
> > /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
> > if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
> > - func = FILE_CHECK;
> > + func = IMA_FILE_CHECK;
> >
> > inode_lock(inode);
> >
> > @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> > if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
> > - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
> > + 0, MAY_EXEC, IMA_MMAP_CHECK);
> > }
> >
> > return 0;
> > @@ -366,13 +366,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> >
> > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> > ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> > - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> > + MAY_EXEC, IMA_BPRM_CHECK);
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> >
> > security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
> > return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
> > - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
> > + MAY_EXEC, IMA_CREDS_CHECK);
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
> > - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> > + MAY_APPEND), IMA_FILE_CHECK);
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
> >
> > @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
> > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> > int must_appraise;
> >
> > - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
> > + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, IMA_FILE_CHECK);
> > if (!must_appraise)
> > return;
> >
> > @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
> > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > int must_appraise;
> >
> > - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
> > + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, IMA_FILE_CHECK);
> > if (!must_appraise)
> > return;
> >
> > @@ -474,12 +474,12 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> > }
> >
> > static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> > - [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > - [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
> > - [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > - [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> > - [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
> > + [READING_FIRMWARE] = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > + [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > + [READING_MODULE] = IMA_MODULE_CHECK,
> > + [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > + [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = IMA_KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> > + [READING_POLICY] = IMA_POLICY_CHECK
> > };
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > - func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> > + func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: IMA_FILE_CHECK;
> > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
> > MAY_READ, func);
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index 26fa9d9723f6..6b39b835861b 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -112,31 +112,31 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> > .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > - {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = IMA_POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_POLICY_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > #endif
> > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
> > @@ -170,31 +170,31 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_MODULE_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > #endif
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > #endif
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > #endif
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_POLICY_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > #endif
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_MODULE_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > - {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = IMA_POLICY_CHECK,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
> > };
> >
> > @@ -292,13 +292,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> > int i;
> >
> > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
> > - (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
> > + (rule->func != func && func != IMA_POST_SETATTR))
> > return false;
> > if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
> > - (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
> > + (rule->mask != mask && func != IMA_POST_SETATTR))
> > return false;
> > if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
> > - (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
> > + (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != IMA_POST_SETATTR))
> > return false;
> > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
> > && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
> > @@ -373,16 +373,16 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
> > return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
> >
> > switch (func) {
> > - case MMAP_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_MMAP_CHECK:
> > return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
> > - case BPRM_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_BPRM_CHECK:
> > return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
> > - case CREDS_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_CREDS_CHECK:
> > return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE;
> > - case FILE_CHECK:
> > - case POST_SETATTR:
> > + case IMA_FILE_CHECK:
> > + case IMA_POST_SETATTR:
> > return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
> > - case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > + case IMA_MODULE_CHECK ... IMA_MAX_CHECK - 1:
> > default:
> > return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
> > }
> > @@ -468,13 +468,13 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
> >
> > static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
> > {
> > - if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
> > + if (func == IMA_MODULE_CHECK)
> > return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
> > - else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
> > + else if (func == IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK)
> > return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
> > - else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
> > + else if (func == IMA_POLICY_CHECK)
> > return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
> > - else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> > + else if (func == IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> > return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
> > return 0;
> > }
> > @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
> > }
> > if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE)
> > temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
> > - if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
> > + if (entries[i].func == IMA_POLICY_CHECK)
> > temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
> > }
> > }
> > @@ -846,29 +846,29 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > result = -EINVAL;
> >
> > if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_FILE_CHECK;
> > /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_FILE_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_MODULE_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_FIRMWARE_CHECK;
> > else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
> > || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
> > - entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_MMAP_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_BPRM_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = CREDS_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_CREDS_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
> > 0)
> > - entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
> > == 0)
> > - entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
> > - entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
> > + entry->func = IMA_POLICY_CHECK;
> > else
> > result = -EINVAL;
> > if (!result)
> > @@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> > */
> > static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
> > {
> > - if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
> > + if (func > 0 && func < IMA_MAX_CHECK)
> > seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
> > else
> > seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
>

--
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>

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