Re: [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2
From: Mimi Zohar
Date: Mon Mar 11 2019 - 21:52:34 EST
On Mon, 2019-03-11 at 17:42 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:24 PM Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 7:56 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > The kexec and kernel modules patches in this patch set continues to
> > > ignore IMA. This patch set should up front either provide an
> > > alternative solution to coordinate the different signature
> > > verification methods or rely on the architecture specific policy for
> > > that coordination.
> > Hi Mimi,
> > I'm working on a patch for this at the moment which can then be added
> > to either patchset. Is there a tree that contains the proposed Power
> > architecture policy? I want to make sure I don't accidentally end up
> > depending on anything x86.
> I've been digging into this some more, and want to ensure that I get
> the appropriate semantics. Are we happy with the x86 solution for
> module signing (ie, if the arch policy is enabled and the kernel
> supports module signatures, use module signatures rather than IMA
There's a slight nuance you're missing. ÂIf the arch policy is enabled
and the kernel supports module signatures, do not add an IMA appraise
rule. ÂA custom policy could require an IMA signature, as well as the
module appended signature.
Saying only use the module signatures, even if the IMA custom policy
contains a kernel module rule, doesn't make sense.
> If so, that just leaves kexec. For platforms that support
> PE signing for kernels (x86 and arm), are we ok punting to that?
Similarly, if the custom policy has a kexec kernel image policy rule,
it shouldn't be ignored.
> If so
> then to maintain the semantics we have for lockdown in general (ie, no
> way for a user to modify ring 0 code) then I think that would mean
> allowing kexec_file() only when the following criteria are met:
> 1) IMA is appraising kexec with digital signatures, either ima digital
> signatures or ima hashes with associated EVM digital signatures
TheÂkernel image could be signed with an appended signature as well.
> 2) CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an
> attacker being able to add a key to the keyring
> Does this sound reasonable? Are there any further criteria that are
> required for this?
With the caveats described above.