[PATCH v19,RESEND 24/27] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions

From: Jarkko Sakkinen
Date: Wed Mar 20 2019 - 12:26:16 EST

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) SGX introduces a new CPL3-only
enclave mode that runs as a sort of black box shared object that is
hosted by an untrusted normal CPL3 process.

Enclave transitions have semantics that are a lovely blend of SYCALL,
SYSRET and VM-Exit. In a non-faulting scenario, entering and exiting
an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific instructions, EENTER
and EEXIT respectively. EENTER+EEXIT is analogous to SYSCALL+SYSRET,
e.g. EENTER/SYSCALL load RCX with the next RIP and EEXIT/SYSRET load
RIP from R{B,C}X.

But in a faulting/interrupting scenario, enclave transitions act more
like VM-Exit and VMRESUME. Maintaining the black box nature of the
enclave means that hardware must automatically switch CPU context when
an Asynchronous Exiting Event (AEE) occurs, an AEE being any interrupt
or exception (exceptions are AEEs because asynchronous in this context
is relative to the enclave and not CPU execution, e.g. the enclave
doesn't get an opportunity to save/fuzz CPU state).

Like VM-Exits, all AEEs jump to a common location, referred to as the
Asynchronous Exiting Point (AEP). The AEP is specified at enclave entry
via register passed to EENTER/ERESUME, similar to how the hypervisor
specifies the VM-Exit point (via VMCS.HOST_RIP at VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME).
Resuming the enclave/VM after the exiting event is handled is done via
ERESUME/VMRESUME respectively. In SGX, AEEs that are handled by the
kernel, e.g. INTR, NMI and most page faults, IRET will journey back to
the AEP which then ERESUMEs th enclave.

Enclaves also behave a bit like VMs in the sense that they can generate
exceptions as part of their normal operation that for all intents and
purposes need to handled in the enclave/VM. However, unlike VMX, SGX
doesn't allow the host to modify its guest's, a.k.a. enclave's, state,
as doing so would circumvent the enclave's security. So to handle an
exception, the enclave must first be re-entered through the normal
EENTER flow (SYSCALL/SYSRET behavior), and then resumed via ERESUME
(VMRESUME behavior) after the source of the exception is resolved.

All of the above is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to running
an enclave. But, SGX was designed in such a way that the host process
can utilize a library to build, launch and run an enclave. This is
roughly analogous to how e.g. libc implementations are used by most
applications so that the application can focus on its business logic.

The big gotcha is that because enclaves can generate *and* handle
exceptions, any SGX library must be prepared to handle nearly any
exception at any time (well, any time a thread is executing in an
enclave). In Linux, this means the SGX library must register a
signal handler in order to intercept relevant exceptions and forward
them to the enclave (or in some cases, take action on behalf of the
enclave). Unfortunately, Linux's signal mechanism doesn't mesh well
with libraries, e.g. signal handlers are process wide, are difficult
to chain, etc... This becomes particularly nasty when using multiple
levels of libraries that register signal handlers, e.g. running an
enclave via cgo inside of the Go runtime.

In comes vDSO to save the day. Now that vDSO can fixup exceptions,
add a function, __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(), to wrap enclave transitions
and intercept any exceptions that occur when running the enclave.

__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() does NOT adhere to the x86-64 ABI and instead
uses a custom calling convention. The primary motivation is to avoid
issues that arise due to asynchronous enclave exits. The x86-64 ABI
requires that EFLAGS.DF, MXCSR and FCW be preserved by the callee, and
unfortunately for the vDSO, the aformentioned registers/bits are not
restored after an asynchronous exit, e.g. EFLAGS.DF is in an unknown
state while MXCSR and FCW are reset to their init values. So the vDSO
cannot simply pass the buck by requiring enclaves to adhere to the
x86-64 ABI. That leaves three somewhat reasonable options:

1) Save/restore non-volatile GPRs, MXCSR and FCW, and clear EFLAGS.DF

+ 100% compliant with the x86-64 ABI
+ Callable from any code
+ Minimal documentation required
- Restoring MXCSR/FCW is likely unnecessary 99% of the time
- Slow

2) Save/restore non-volatile GPRs and clear EFLAGS.DF

+ Mostly compliant with the x86-64 ABI
+ Callable from any code that doesn't use SIMD registers
- Need to document deviations from x86-64 ABI, i.e. MXCSR and FCW

3) Require the caller to save/restore everything.

+ Fast
+ Userspace can pass all GPRs to the enclave (minus EAX, RBX and RCX)
- Custom ABI
- For all intents and purposes must be called from an assembly wrapper

__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() implements option (3). The custom ABI is
mostly a documentation issue, and even that is offset by the fact that
being more similar to hardware's ENCLU[EENTER/ERESUME] ABI reduces the
amount of documentation needed for the vDSO, e.g. options (2) and (3)
would need to document which registers are marshalled to/from enclaves.
Requiring an assembly wrapper imparts minimal pain on userspace as SGX
libraries and/or applications need a healthy chunk of assembly, e.g. in
the enclave, regardless of the vDSO's implementation.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dr. Greg Wettstein <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 18 +++++
4 files changed, 118 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 34bcf87d358c..fb5b9960b192 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y

# files to link into the vdso
vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
+vobjs-$(VDSO64-y) += vsgx_enter_enclave.o

# files to link into kernel
obj-y += vma.o extable.o
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso-note.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_vvar.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx_enter_enclave.o = -pg

# X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
index d3a2dce4cfa9..50952a995a6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ VERSION {
+ __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
local: *;
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af572adcd8ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include "extable.h"
+#define EX_LEAF 0*8
+#define EX_TRAPNR 0*8+4
+#define EX_ERROR_CODE 0*8+6
+#define EX_ADDRESS 1*8
+.section .text, "ax"
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() - Enter an SGX enclave
+ *
+ * %eax: ENCLU leaf, must be EENTER or ERESUME
+ * %rbx: TCS, must be non-NULL
+ * %rcx: Optional pointer to 'struct sgx_enclave_exception'
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on a clean entry/exit to/from the enclave
+ * -EINVAL if ENCLU leaf is not allowed or if TCS is NULL
+ * -EFAULT if ENCLU or the enclave faults
+ *
+ * Note that __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() is not compliant with the x86-64 ABI.
+ * All registers except RSP must be treated as volatile from the caller's
+ * perspective, including but not limited to GPRs, EFLAGS.DF, MXCSR, FCW, etc...
+ * Conversely, the enclave being run must preserve the untrusted RSP and stack.
+ *
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(u32 leaf, void *tcs,
+ * struct sgx_enclave_exception *exception_info)
+ * {
+ * if (leaf != SGX_EENTER && leaf != SGX_ERESUME)
+ * return -EINVAL;
+ *
+ * if (!tcs)
+ * return -EINVAL;
+ *
+ * try {
+ * ENCLU[leaf];
+ * } catch (exception) {
+ * if (e)
+ * *e = exception;
+ * return -EFAULT;
+ * }
+ *
+ * return 0;
+ * }
+ */
+ /* EENTER <= leaf <= ERESUME */
+ cmp $0x2, %eax
+ jb bad_input
+ cmp $0x3, %eax
+ ja bad_input
+ /* TCS must be non-NULL */
+ test %rbx, %rbx
+ je bad_input
+ /* Save @exception_info */
+ push %rcx
+ /* Load AEP for ENCLU */
+ lea 1f(%rip), %rcx
+1: enclu
+ add $0x8, %rsp
+ xor %eax, %eax
+ ret
+ mov $(-EINVAL), %rax
+ ret
+.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
+ /* Re-load @exception_info and fill it (if it's non-NULL) */
+2: pop %rcx
+ test %rcx, %rcx
+ je 3f
+ mov %eax, EX_LEAF(%rcx)
+ mov %di, EX_TRAPNR(%rcx)
+ mov %si, EX_ERROR_CODE(%rcx)
+ mov %rdx, EX_ADDRESS(%rcx)
+3: mov $(-EFAULT), %rax
+ ret
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
index 150a784db395..76834456ab07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -69,4 +69,22 @@ struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
__u64 attribute_fd;

+ * struct sgx_enclave_exception - structure to report exceptions encountered in
+ * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave()
+ *
+ * @leaf: ENCLU leaf from %rax at time of exception
+ * @trapnr: exception trap number, a.k.a. fault vector
+ * @error_cdde: exception error code
+ * @address: exception address, e.g. CR2 on a #PF
+ * @reserved: reserved for future use
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_exception {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u16 trapnr;
+ __u16 error_code;
+ __u64 address;
+ __u64 reserved[2];
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */