Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
From: Andre Przywara
Date: Mon Mar 25 2019 - 06:33:52 EST
On Thu, 21 Mar 2019 18:05:47 -0500
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather
> than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on
> machines that are safe. This can happen when the
> mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR.
> This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled
> other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the
> machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown.
> Trivial whitespace tweaks.
Thanks for those changes, I am happy with them. The whole series looks
ready to me now.
> Revert the changes to remove the CONFIG_EXPERT hidden
> options, but leave the detection paths building
> without #ifdef wrappers. Also remove the
> CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES #ifdefs
> as we are 'select'ing the option in the Kconfig.
> This allows us to keep all three variations of
> the CONFIG/enable/disable paths without a lot of
> (CONFIG_X || CONFIG_Y) checks.
> Various bits/pieces moved between the patches in an attempt
> to keep similar features/changes together.
> Drop the patch which selectivly exports sysfs entries
> Remove the CONFIG_EXPERT hidden options which allowed
> the kernel to be built without the vulnerability
> detection code.
> Pick Marc Z's patches which invert the white/black
> lists for spectrev2 and clean up the firmware
> detection logic.
> Document the existing kpti controls
> Add a nospectre_v2 option to boot time disable the
> Remove "Unknown" states, replace with further blacklists
> and default vulnerable/not affected states.
> Add the ability for an arch port to selectively export
> sysfs vulnerabilities.
> Add "Unknown" state to ABI/testing docs.
> Minor tweaks.
> Jeremy Linton (6):
> arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation
> arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
> arm64: Always enable spectrev2 vulnerability detection
> arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2
> arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection
> arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
> Marc Zyngier (2):
> arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof
> arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2
> Mian Yousaf Kaukab (2):
> arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1
> arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +-
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 4 -
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 239 +++++++++++++-----
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 58 ++++-
> 5 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)