[PATCH 5.0 097/117] xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 42d8644bd77dd2d747e004e367cb0c895a606f39 upstream.

The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall().
It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
elements.  We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of
bounds access.

Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call,
 	__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
 	__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
 
+	if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0]))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
 		     : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
 		     : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])