On Thu, 2019-06-06 at 13:43 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
On 6/6/2019 1:26 PM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
Previous versions included the patch 'ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN
EVM status'. However, I realized that this patch cannot be accepted alone
because IMA-Appraisal would deny access to new files created during the
boot. With the current behavior, those files are accessible because they
have a valid security.ima (not protected by EVM) created after the first
A solution for this problem is to initialize EVM very early with a random
key. Access to created files will be granted, even with the strict
appraisal, because after the first write those files will have both
security.ima and security.evm (HMAC calculated with the random key).
Strict appraisal will work only if it is done with signatures until the
persistent HMAC key is loaded.
- remove patch 1/3 (evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc());
- remove patch 3/3 (ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly);
- add new patch (evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot)
- patch 2/3: modify patch description
Roberto, as I tried explaining previously, this feature is not a
simple bug fix. ÂThese patches, if upstreamed, will be upstreamed the
normal way, during an open window. ÂWhether they are classified as a
bug fix has yet to be decided.
Please stop Cc'ing stable. ÂIf I don't Cc stable before sending the pull request, then Greg and Sasha have been really good about deciding which patches should be backported. Â(Please refer to the comment on "Cc'ing stable" in section "5) Select the recipients for your patch" in Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
I'll review these patches, but in the future please use an appropriate patch set cover letter title in the subject line.