Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux

From: Sean Christopherson
Date: Thu Jun 13 2019 - 15:53:17 EST


On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 02:00:29PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 6/11/19 6:55 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote:
> >You are right that there are SGX specific stuff. More precisely, SGX
> >enclaves don't have access to anything except memory, so there are only 3
> >questions that need to be answered for each enclave page: 1) whether X is
> >allowed; 2) whether W->X is allowed and 3 whether WX is allowed. This
> >proposal tries to cache the answers to those questions upon creation of each
> >enclave page, meaning it involves a) figuring out the answers and b)
> >"remember" them for every page. #b is generic, mostly captured in
> >intel_sgx.c, and could be shared among all LSM modules; while #a is SELinux
> >specific. I could move intel_sgx.c up one level in the directory hierarchy
> >if that's what you'd suggest.
> >
> >By "SGX", did you mean the SGX subsystem being upstreamed? It doesnât track
> >that state. In practice, there's no way for SGX to track it because there's
> >no vm_ops->may_mprotect() callback. It doesn't follow the philosophy of
> >Linux either, as mprotect() doesn't track it for regular memory. And it
> >doesn't have a use without LSM, so I believe it makes more sense to track it
> >inside LSM.
>
> Yes, the SGX driver/subsystem. I had the impression from Sean that it does
> track this kind of per-page state already in some manner, but possibly he
> means it does under a given proposal and not in the current driver.

Yeah, under a given proposal. SGX has per-page tracking, adding new flags
is fairly easy. Philosophical objections aside, adding .may_mprotect() is
trivial.

> Even the #b remembering might end up being SELinux-specific if we also have
> to remember the original inputs used to compute the answer so that we can
> audit that information when access is denied later upon mprotect(). At the
> least we'd need it to save some opaque data and pass it to a callback into
> SELinux to perform that auditing.