Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME
From: Lendacky, Thomas
Date: Mon Jun 17 2019 - 22:07:11 EST
On 6/17/19 8:40 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 6:34 PM Lendacky, Thomas
> <Thomas.Lendacky@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 6/17/19 6:59 PM, Kai Huang wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2019-06-17 at 11:27 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> And yes from my reading (better to have AMD guys to confirm) SEV guest uses anonymous memory, but it
>>> also pins all guest memory (by calling GUP from KVM -- SEV specifically introduced 2 KVM ioctls for
>>> this purpose), since SEV architecturally cannot support swapping, migraiton of SEV-encrypted guest
>>> memory, because SME/SEV also uses physical address as "tweak", and there's no way that kernel can
>>> get or use SEV-guest's memory encryption key. In order to swap/migrate SEV-guest memory, we need SGX
>>> EPC eviction/reload similar thing, which SEV doesn't have today.
>> Yes, all the guest memory is currently pinned by calling GUP when creating
>> an SEV guest.
> What happens if QEMU tries to read the memory? Does it just see
> ciphertext? Is cache coherency lost if QEMU writes it?
If QEMU tries to read the memory is would just see ciphertext. I'll
double check on the write situation, but I think you would end up with
a cache coherency issue because the write by QEMU would be with the
hypervisor key and tagged separately in the cache from the guest cache
entry. SEV provides confidentiality of guest memory from the hypervisor,
it doesn't prevent the hypervisor from trashing the guest memory.