Re: [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
From: Matthew Garrett
Date: Mon Jun 24 2019 - 15:54:14 EST
On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 8:37 AM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 06/22/2019 02:03 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
> Nit: that
> > bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow
> Please explain how bpf_probe_write_user reads kernel memory ... ?!
> > private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
> > be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
> ... and while we're at it, also how they allow "kernel memory to be
> altered without restriction". I've been pointing this false statement
> out long ago.
Yup. How's the following description:
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
There are some bpf functions that can be used to read kernel memory and
exfiltrate it to userland: bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and
bpf_trace_printk. These could be abused to (eg) allow private
keys in kernel
memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked
down in confidentiality
> This whole thing is still buggy as has been pointed out before by
> Jann. For helpers like above and few others below, error conditions
> must clear the buffer ...
Sorry, yes. My fault.