Re: general protection fault in tls_sk_proto_close (2)

From: John Fastabend
Date: Thu Aug 29 2019 - 18:18:58 EST


Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:48:32 -0700, John Fastabend wrote:
> > Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > > On Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:00 +0800, Hillf Danton wrote:
> > > > Alternatively work is done if sock is closed again. Anyway ctx is reset
> > > > under sock's callback lock in write mode.
> > > >
> > > > --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
> > > > +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> > > > @@ -295,6 +295,8 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct so
> > > > long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, 0);
> > > > bool free_ctx;
> > > >
> > > > + if (!ctx)
> > > > + return;
> > > > if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_SW)
> > > > tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(ctx);
> > >
> > > That's no bueno, the real socket's close will never get called.
> >
> > Seems when we refactored BPF side we dropped the check for ULP on one
> > path so I'll add that back now. It would be nice and seems we are
> > getting closer now that tls side is a bit more dynamic if the ordering
> > didn't matter.
>
> We'd probably need some more generic way of communicating the changes
> in sk_proto stack, e.g. by moving the update into one of sk_proto
> callbacks? but yes.
>
> > diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
> > index 1330a7442e5b..30d11558740e 100644
> > --- a/net/core/sock_map.c
> > +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
> > @@ -666,6 +666,8 @@ static int sock_hash_update_common(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
> > WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
> > if (unlikely(flags > BPF_EXIST))
> > return -EINVAL;
> > + if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_ulp_data))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> >
> > link = sk_psock_init_link();
> > if (!link)
>
> Thanks! That looks good, if you feel like submitting officially feel
> free to add my Reviewed-by!

I'll send it out this evening after running the selftests.

.John