[PATCH 5.4 13/66] x86/stackframe/32: Repair 32-bit Xen PV

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Wed Nov 27 2019 - 16:14:40 EST


From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 81ff2c37f9e5d77593928df0536d86443195fd64 upstream.

Once again RPL checks have been introduced which don't account for a 32-bit
kernel living in ring 1 when running in a PV Xen domain. The case in
FIXUP_FRAME has been preventing boot.

Adjust BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 as well to guard against future uses of the macro
on a code path reachable when running in PV mode under Xen; I have to admit
that I stopped at a certain point trying to figure out whether there are
present ones.

Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0fad341f-b7f5-f859-d55d-f0084ee7087e@xxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
.if \no_user_check == 0
/* coming from usermode? */
- testl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
+ testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
jz .Lend_\@
.endif
/* On user-cr3? */
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@
testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, 4*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
#endif
- testl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 3*4(%esp)
+ testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 3*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@

orl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 3*4(%esp)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@
*/
#define SEGMENT_RPL_MASK 0x3

+/*
+ * When running on Xen PV, the actual privilege level of the kernel is 1,
+ * not 0. Testing the Requested Privilege Level in a segment selector to
+ * determine whether the context is user mode or kernel mode with
+ * SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is wrong because the PV kernel's privilege level
+ * matches the 0x3 mask.
+ *
+ * Testing with USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is valid for both native and Xen PV
+ * kernels because privilege level 2 is never used.
+ */
+#define USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK 0x2
+
/* User mode is privilege level 3: */
#define USER_RPL 0x3