Re: [PATCH bpf-next 4/7] bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN

From: Andrii Nakryiko
Date: Tue Mar 03 2020 - 17:44:45 EST


On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 6:12 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> From: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> - Functions that are whitlisted by for error injection i.e.
> within_error_injection_list.
> - Security hooks, this is expected to be cleaned up after the KRSI
> patches introduce the LSM_HOOK macro:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200220175250.10795-1-kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx/

Commit message can use a bit more work for sure. Why (and even what)
of the changes is not really explained well.

>
> - The attachment is currently limited to functions that return an int.
> This can be extended later other types (e.g. PTR).
>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/btf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> index 30841fb8b3c0..50080add2ab9 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> @@ -3710,14 +3710,26 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
> nr_args--;
> }
>
> - if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
> - prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) &&
> - arg == nr_args) {
> - if (!t)
> - /* Default prog with 5 args. 6th arg is retval. */
> - return true;
> - /* function return type */
> - t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
> + if (arg == nr_args) {
> + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT) {
> + if (!t)
> + return true;
> + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
> + } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
> + /* For now the BPF_MODIFY_RETURN can only be attached to
> + * functions that return an int.
> + */
> + if (!t)
> + return false;
> +
> + t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL);
> + if (!btf_type_is_int(t)) {

Should the size of int be verified here? E.g., if some function
returns u8, is that ok for BPF program to return, say, (1<<30) ?

> + bpf_log(log,
> + "ret type %s not allowed for fmod_ret\n",
> + btf_kind_str[BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info)]);
> + return false;
> + }
> + }
> } else if (arg >= nr_args) {
> bpf_log(log, "func '%s' doesn't have %d-th argument\n",
> tname, arg + 1);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 2460c8e6b5be..ae32517d4ccd 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <linux/sort.h>
> #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> #include <linux/ctype.h>
> +#include <linux/error-injection.h>
>
> #include "disasm.h"
>
> @@ -9800,6 +9801,33 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>
> return 0;
> }
> +#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
> +
> +static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> +{
> + struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
> + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr;
> +
> + if (within_error_injection_list(addr))
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort
> + * introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h.
> + */
> + if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
> + sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) {
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n",
> + prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name);
> +
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
>
> static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> {
> @@ -10000,6 +10028,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> }
> tr->func.addr = (void *)addr;
> prog->aux->trampoline = tr;
> +
> + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN)
> + ret = check_attach_modify_return(env);
> out:
> mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex);
> if (ret)
> --
> 2.20.1
>