Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

[Christian Brauner]

On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 04:49:52PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> Opening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
> CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for
> checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via
> the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 65893686d1f1..cada783f229e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2194,16 +2194,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
>  };
>  
>  /*
> - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
> - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
> - * path to the file in question.
> + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
> + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
> + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
>   */
>  static const char *
>  proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  			struct inode *inode,
>  		        struct delayed_call *done)
>  {
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE))

So right now, when I'd do

git grep checkpoint_restore_ns_capable

I'd not hit that codepath which isn't great. So I'd suggest to use:

if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns))

at the end of the day, capable(<cap>) just calls
ns_capable(&init_user_ns, <cap>) anyway.

Thanks!
Christian