Re: [PATCH] netlink: add buffer boundary checking

From: Mark Salyzyn
Date: Fri Jul 24 2020 - 17:45:26 EST


On 7/24/20 2:14 PM, Jacob Keller wrote:

On 7/23/2020 12:35 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
On 7/23/20 11:21 AM, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
Many of the nla_get_* inlines fail to check attribute's length before
copying the content resulting in possible out-of-boundary accesses.
Adjust the inlines to perform nla_len checking, for the most part
using the nla_memcpy function to faciliate since these are not
necessarily performance critical and do not need a likely fast path.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: kernel-team@xxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@xxxxxxx>
Fixes: bfa83a9e03cf ("[NETLINK]: Type-safe netlink messages/attributes interface")
---
include/net/netlink.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netlink.h b/include/net/netlink.h
index c0411f14fb53..11c0f153be7c 100644
--- a/include/net/netlink.h
+++ b/include/net/netlink.h
@@ -1538,7 +1538,11 @@ static inline int nla_put_bitfield32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype,
*/
static inline u32 nla_get_u32(const struct nlattr *nla)
{
- return *(u32 *) nla_data(nla);
+ u32 tmp;
+
+ nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp));
+
+ return tmp;
I believe this will hide bugs, that syzbot was able to catch.

Instead, you could perhaps introduce a CONFIG_DEBUG_NETLINK option,
and add a WARN_ON_ONCE(nla_len(nla) < sizeof(u32)) so that we can detect bugs in callers.


I also think this is a better approach.

We (another engineer here) are looking into that and will get back to everyone.

Sincerely -- Mark Salyzyn