Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot

[Mickaël Salaün]

On 10/03/2021 18:22, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/10/2021 8:09 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
>> the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability.  This protects against malicious
>> procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries.  The following patch
>> allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2).
> 
> Mount namespaces have pretty well obsoleted chroot(). CAP_SYS_CHROOT is
> one of the few fine grained capabilities. We're still finding edge cases
> (e.g. ptrace) where no_new_privs is imperfect. I doesn't seem that there
> is a compelling reason to remove the privilege requirement on chroot().

What is the link between chroot and ptrace?
What is interesting with CAP_SYS_CHROOT?

> 
>>
>> This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
>> time ago:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
>>
>> This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 .  I would really
>> appreciate constructive reviews.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Mickaël Salaün (1):
>>   fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
>>
>>  fs/open.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>  1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>>
>> base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15
>