Re: [syzbot] kernel panic: corrupted stack end in openat

From: Dmitry Vyukov
Date: Tue Mar 16 2021 - 06:18:35 EST


On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 11:02 AM Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 8:18 AM syzbot
> > <syzbot+0b06ef9b44d00d600183@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > syzbot found the following issue on:
> > >
> > > HEAD commit: 1e28eed1 Linux 5.12-rc3
> > > git tree: upstream
> > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=167535e6d00000
> > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e0cee1f53de33ca3
> > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0b06ef9b44d00d600183
> > > userspace arch: arm
> > >
> > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.
> > >
> > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+0b06ef9b44d00d600183@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > +arm32 maintainer
> > I think this is a real stack overflow on arm32, the stack is indeed deep.
>
> Nice find. I see there was already a second report, so it seems to be
> reproducible as well.
> If you are able to trigger this reliably, you could try printing the frame
> pointer while unwinding to see what is actually going on:
>
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ void dump_backtrace_entry(unsigned long where,
> unsigned long from,
> unsigned long end = frame + 4 + sizeof(struct pt_regs);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
> - printk("%s[<%08lx>] (%ps) from [<%08lx>] (%pS)\n",
> - loglvl, where, (void *)where, from, (void *)from);
> + printk("%s[<%08lx>] (%ps) from [<%08lx>] (%pS), frame %08lx\n",
> + loglvl, where, (void *)where, from, (void *)from, frame);
> #else
> printk("%sFunction entered at [<%08lx>] from [<%08lx>]\n",
> loglvl, where, from);
>
> If that doesn't help, I could have a look at the binary to see which
> functions in the call chain take a lot of stack space, if any.
>
> Which exact compiler version do you use for building these
> kernels? I can try doing a build with the same commit and config.
>
> This one function is one that I have seen before when looking at build
> warnings with KASAN:
>
> > > [<8073772c>] (integrity_kernel_read) from [<8073a904>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm+0x178/0x228 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:484)
> > > [<8073a78c>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm) from [<8073ae2c>] (ima_calc_file_shash security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:515 [inline])
> > > [<8073a78c>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm) from [<8073ae2c>] (ima_calc_file_hash+0x124/0x8b8 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:572)
>
> ima_calc_file_hash_tfm() has a SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(), which by itself can
> use up 512 bytes, but KASAN sometimes triples this number. However, I see
> you do not actually have KASAN enabled, so there is probably more to it.

The compiler is gcc version 10.2.1 20210110 (Debian 10.2.1-6)
It's available in gcr.io/syzkaller/syzbot container.
(syzbot should have been provided the compiler version, something
broke, I've filed https://github.com/google/syzkaller/issues/2498 for
this)

Yes, KASAN is not enabled on arm32 for now.

Re printing FP, syzbot does not use custom patches:
http://bit.do/syzbot#no-custom-patches
But this does not seem to be syzbot-specific. It seems that any arm32
stack overflow report will be unactionable, so I think it would be
useful to include this into the mainline kernel to make overflow
reports useful for everybody (and for syzbot as a side effect).