[PATCH v1 00/11] Add TDX Guest Support (Initial support)
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
Date: Tue Jun 01 2021 - 22:21:49 EST
Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect guest VMs from malicious
hosts and some physical attacks. This series adds the basic TDX guest
infrastructure support (including #VE handler support, and #VE support
for halt and CPUID). This is just a subset of patches in the bare minimum
TDX support patch list which is required for supporting minimal
functional TDX guest. Other basic feature features like #VE support for
IO, MMIO, boot optimization fixes and shared-mm support will be submitted
in a separate patch set. To make reviewing easier we split it into smaller
series. This series alone is not necessarily fully functional.
Also, the host-side support patches, and support for advanced TD guest
features like attestation or debug-mode will be submitted at a later time.
Also, at this point it is not secure with some known holes in drivers, and
also hasn’t been fully audited and fuzzed yet.
TDX has a lot of similarities to SEV. It enhances confidentiality and
of guest memory and state (like registers) and includes a new exception
(#VE) for the same basic reasons as SEV-ES. Like SEV-SNP (not merged
yet), TDX limits the host's ability to effect changes in the guest
physical address space. With TDX the host cannot access the guest memory,
so various functionality that would normally be done in KVM has moved
into a (paravirtualized) guest. Partially this is done using the
Virtualization Exception (#VE) and partially with direct paravirtual hooks.
The TDX architecture also includes a new CPU mode called
Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM). The software (TDX module) running in this
mode arbitrates interactions between host and guest and implements many of
the guarantees of the TDX architecture.
Some of the key differences between TD and regular VM is,
1. Multi CPU bring-up is done using the ACPI MADT wake-up table.
2. A new #VE exception handler is added. The TDX module injects #VE exception
to the guest TD in cases of instructions that need to be emulated, disallowed
MSR accesses, etc.
3. By default memory is marked as private, and TD will selectively share it with
VMM based on need.
Note that the kernel will also need to be hardened against low level inputs from
the now untrusted hosts. This will be done in follow on patches.
You can find TDX related documents in the following link.
Kirill A. Shutemov (7):
x86/paravirt: Move halt paravirt calls under CONFIG_PARAVIRT
x86/tdx: Get TD execution environment information via TDINFO
x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest
x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guest
x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls
x86/tdx: Add MSR support for TDX guest
x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (4):
x86/tdx: Introduce INTEL_TDX_GUEST config option
x86/cpufeatures: Add TDX Guest CPU feature
x86/x86: Add is_tdx_guest() interface
x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper
arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c | 32 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 40 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 21 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 20 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 153 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 22 +++
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 6 +
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/tdcall.S | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 69 +++++++
18 files changed, 877 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/tdcall.S
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c