[PATCH 5.13 2/8] bpf: Add _kernel suffix to internal lockdown_bpf_read

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 71330842ff93ae67a066c1fa68d75672527312fa upstream.

Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming
more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 include/linux/security.h |    2 +-
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c     |    4 ++--
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c |    8 ++++----
 security/security.c      |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
-	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
+	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL,
 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
 	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -1070,12 +1070,12 @@ bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id fun
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_snprintf_btf:
 		return &bpf_snprintf_btf_proto;
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -999,19 +999,19 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
-		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+		return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
 		       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKD
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
-	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
 	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
 	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",