Re: [PATCH] [SECURITY] suid procs exec'd with bad 0,1,2 fds

Horst von Brand (vonbrand@inf.utfsm.cl)
Wed, 05 Aug 1998 11:56:26 -0400


linker@z.ml.org said:
> On Wed, 5 Aug 1998, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> > On Tue, 4 Aug 1998 linker@z.ml.org wrote:
> > > As for changing the address to someplace in libc, couldn't we relocated
> > > all libs so that they have a null byte in their address?

> > What are you trying to achieve with this? Sorry, I don't get it.

> Okay, what atacker does is something like
>
> [buffer.......][returnaddress]
>
> Fill^^^^^^^^^^^place address of function in libc of something bad.
>
> The copy routines that people exploit copy null terminated strings. So the
> exploiter must make their exploit code void of null characters, because
> sending one will stop the copy. If you make it tougher to form a pointer
> to that 'bad' functions without using null characters then it makes their
> job harder.

The job of exploiting it to get a shell gets harder, the job of just
crashing the affected application (which probably is very bad in itself)
stays just the same... and the application is just as broken as before.
Why bother?

-- 
Dr. Horst H. von Brand                       mailto:vonbrand@inf.utfsm.cl
Departamento de Informatica                     Fono: +56 32 654431
Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria              +56 32 654239
Casilla 110-V, Valparaiso, Chile                Fax:  +56 32 797513

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