Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] openat2: new OPENAT2_REGULAR flag support
From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Sun Mar 08 2026 - 13:10:53 EST
On Sun, Mar 8, 2026 at 4:40 AM Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Sat, 2026-03-07 at 10:56 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar 7, 2026 at 6:09 AM Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > This flag indicates the path should be opened if it's a regular file.
> > > This is useful to write secure programs that want to avoid being
> > > tricked into opening device nodes with special semantics while thinking
> > > they operate on regular files. This is a requested feature from the
> > > uapi-group[1].
> > >
> >
> > I think this needs a lot more clarification as to what "regular"
> > means. If it's literally
> >
> > > A corresponding error code EFTYPE has been introduced. For example, if
> > > openat2 is called on path /dev/null with OPENAT2_REGULAR in the flag
> > > param, it will return -EFTYPE. EFTYPE is already used in BSD systems
> > > like FreeBSD, macOS.
> >
> > I think this needs more clarification as to what "regular" means,
> > since S_IFREG may not be sufficient. The UAPI group page says:
> >
> > Use-Case: this would be very useful to write secure programs that want
> > to avoid being tricked into opening device nodes with special
> > semantics while thinking they operate on regular files. This is
> > particularly relevant as many device nodes (or even FIFOs) come with
> > blocking I/O (or even blocking open()!) by default, which is not
> > expected from regular files backed by “fast” disk I/O. Consider
> > implementation of a naive web browser which is pointed to
> > file://dev/zero, not expecting an endless amount of data to read.
> >
> > What about procfs? What about sysfs? What about /proc/self/fd/17
> > where that fd is a memfd? What about files backed by non-"fast" disk
> > I/O like something on a flaky USB stick or a network mount or FUSE?
> >
> > Are we concerned about blocking open? (open blocks as a matter of
> > course.) Are we concerned about open having strange side effects?
> > Are we concerned about write having strange side effects? Are we
> > concerned about cases where opening the file as root results in
> > elevated privilege beyond merely gaining the ability to write to that
> > specific path on an ordinary filesystem?
> >
>
> Above the use-case, it also says:
>
> "O_REGULAR (inspired by the existing O_DIRECTORY flag for open()),
> which opens a file only if it is of type S_IFREG."
>
> Since we allow programs to open a directory under /proc or /sys using
> O_DIRECTORY, I don't think we should do anything different here. To the
> VFS, all of the examples you gave above are S_IFREG "regular files",
> even if they are backed by something quite irregular.
That's certainly a valid and consistent way to define this, but is it useful?
--Andy