KCSAN: data-race in __remove_assoc_queue / mark_buffer_dirty_inode
From: Jianzhou Zhao
Date: Wed Mar 11 2026 - 03:52:08 EST
Subject: [BUG] fs/buffer: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_assoc_queue / mark_buffer_dirty_inode
Dear Maintainers,
We are writing to report a KCSAN-detected data race vulnerability within `fs/buffer.c`. This bug was found by our custom fuzzing tool, RacePilot. The race condition occurs when `__remove_assoc_queue` updates `bh->b_assoc_map` while `mark_buffer_dirty_inode` performs a lockless speculative read on the exact same variable before trying to acquire the associative lock. We observed this bug on the Linux kernel version 6.18.0-08691-g2061f18ad76e-dirty.
Call Trace & Context
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_assoc_queue / mark_buffer_dirty_inode
write to 0xffff88802a6cc1f8 of 8 bytes by task 25093 on cpu 1:
__remove_assoc_queue+0xae/0xd0 fs/buffer.c:524
fsync_buffers_list+0x183/0x750 fs/buffer.c:823
sync_mapping_buffers+0x59/0x90 fs/buffer.c:585
fat_file_fsync+0xbb/0x100 fs/fat/file.c:195
vfs_fsync_range+0xe8/0x170 fs/sync.c:197
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2630 [inline]
generic_file_write_iter+0x1ee/0x210 mm/filemap.c:4494
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
vfs_write+0x78f/0x910 fs/read_write.c:701
ksys_write+0xbe/0x190 fs/read_write.c:753
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:764 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:761 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:761
x64_sys_call+0x1022/0x2030 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xae/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88802a6cc1f8 of 8 bytes by task 25074 on cpu 0:
mark_buffer_dirty_inode+0x9c/0x250 fs/buffer.c:711
fat_mirror_bhs+0x280/0x3b0 fs/fat/fatent.c:417
fat_alloc_clusters+0xaed/0xb90 fs/fat/fatent.c:568
fat_add_cluster+0x34/0xc0 fs/fat/inode.c:111
__fat_get_block fs/fat/inode.c:159 [inline]
fat_get_block+0x3c4/0x550 fs/fat/inode.c:194
__block_write_begin_int+0x29e/0xcd0 fs/buffer.c:2186
block_write_begin+0x74/0xf0 fs/buffer.c:2297
cont_write_begin+0x402/0x5d0 fs/buffer.c:2635
fat_write_begin+0x4f/0xe0 fs/fat/inode.c:233
generic_perform_write+0x13c/0x4c0 mm/filemap.c:4341
__generic_file_write_iter+0x117/0x130 mm/filemap.c:4464
generic_file_write_iter+0xa5/0x210 mm/filemap.c:4490
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
vfs_write+0x78f/0x910 fs/read_write.c:701
ksys_write+0xbe/0x190 fs/read_write.c:753
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:764 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:761 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:761
x64_sys_call+0x1022/0x2030 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xae/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0xffff88802a5fa008 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 25074 Comm: syz.2.1198 Not tainted 6.18.0-08691-g2061f18ad76e-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
==================================================================
Execution Flow & Code Context
During a buffer fsync trigger (e.g. from `fat_file_fsync`), `fsync_buffers_list()` is responsible for looping over the inode's private buffer list. At the start of its loop, it isolates the buffer and calls `__remove_assoc_queue()`, which clears `bh->b_assoc_map` using a plain C store under `buffer_mapping->i_private_lock`:
```c
// fs/buffer.c
static void __remove_assoc_queue(struct buffer_head *bh)
{
list_del_init(&bh->b_assoc_buffers);
WARN_ON(!bh->b_assoc_map);
bh->b_assoc_map = NULL; // <-- Plain concurrent write
}
```
Meanwhile, another process actively dirtying a buffer triggers `mark_buffer_dirty_inode()`. This function optimistically checks whether the buffer head is already associated with an inode mapping structure using a lockless peek at `bh->b_assoc_map`. If the map is unassigned, it acquires the target `i_private_lock` and updates it:
```c
// fs/buffer.c
void mark_buffer_dirty_inode(struct buffer_head *bh, struct inode *inode)
{
...
if (!bh->b_assoc_map) { // <-- Lockless plain concurrent read
spin_lock(&buffer_mapping->i_private_lock);
list_move_tail(&bh->b_assoc_buffers, &mapping->i_private_list);
bh->b_assoc_map = mapping;
spin_unlock(&buffer_mapping->i_private_lock);
}
}
```
Root Cause Analysis
A read-write KCSAN data race arises because `__remove_assoc_queue()` assigns `bh->b_assoc_map` while holding `i_private_lock` without employing any memory model volatile annotations. At the exact same snapshot, `mark_buffer_dirty_inode()` evaluates `if (!bh->b_assoc_map)` out of the lock domain to optimize out taking the spinlock for an already-associated buffer block.
Unfortunately, we were unable to generate a reproducer for this bug.
Potential Impact
This data race is largely benign from a runtime control-flow perspective; the lack of association triggers a spinlock wait to assign the buffer, whereas an obsolete read evaluating to actual pointers skips the lock and skips the queue placement. If extreme read tearing or heavy compiler optimization happens, it could possibly lead to duplicate list inclusions or desynchronised buffer dirty associations, which could eventually yield missed buffers during `fsync` requests. However, triggering KCSAN logs adds extensive noise over expected logic.
Proposed Fix
To align with the Linux Memory Model and inform KCSAN that this speculative read is intentional and expected (and to prevent compiler tearing optimisations), we should simply wrap the condition check in `mark_buffer_dirty_inode` using the `data_race()` macro. Furthermore, employing `WRITE_ONCE` in `__remove_assoc_queue` reinforces safety.
```diff
--- a/fs/buffer.c
+++ b/fs/buffer.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static void __remove_assoc_queue(struct buffer_head *bh)
{
list_del_init(&bh->b_assoc_buffers);
WARN_ON(!bh->b_assoc_map);
- bh->b_assoc_map = NULL;
+ WRITE_ONCE(bh->b_assoc_map, NULL);
}
int inode_has_buffers(struct inode *inode)
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ void mark_buffer_dirty_inode(struct buffer_head *bh, struct inode *inode)
} else {
BUG_ON(mapping->i_private_data != buffer_mapping);
}
- if (!bh->b_assoc_map) {
+ if (!data_race(bh->b_assoc_map)) {
spin_lock(&buffer_mapping->i_private_lock);
list_move_tail(&bh->b_assoc_buffers, &mapping->i_private_list);
bh->b_assoc_map = mapping;
```
We would be highly honored if this could be of any help.
Best regards,
RacePilot Team