Re: [PATCH] LoongArch: add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table

[Xi Ruoyao]

On Tue, 2026-03-24 at 17:30 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but
> does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past
> the
> syscall function pointer tables.
> 
> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
> Cc: stable <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> My scripts caught this as I think LoongArch is vulnerable to the

There's no evidence.  The kernel currently report all LoongArch
processors invulnerable to spectre V1 via cpuinfo.

So NAK unless there's a reproducer of spectre V1 on LoongArch.  If so
we'd also need to adjust the cpuinfo output.

-- 
Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xxxxxxxxxxx>