Re: [PATCH v3 6/9] security: Hornet LSM

[Paul Moore]

On Mar 26, 2026 Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> This adds the Hornet Linux Security Module which provides enhanced
> signature verification and data validation for eBPF programs. This
> allows users to continue to maintain an invariant that all code
> running inside of the kernel has actually been signed and verified, by
> the kernel.
> 
> This effort builds upon the currently excepted upstream solution. It
> further hardens it by providing deterministic, in-kernel checking of
> map hashes to solidify auditing along with preventing TOCTOU attacks
> against lskel map hashes.
> 
> Target map hashes are passed in via PKCS#7 signed attributes. Hornet
> determines the extent which the eBFP program is signed and defers to
> other LSMs for policy decisions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Nacked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Hornet.rst | 321 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst  |   1 +
>  MAINTAINERS                              |   9 +
>  include/linux/oid_registry.h             |   3 +
>  include/uapi/linux/lsm.h                 |   1 +
>  security/Kconfig                         |   3 +-
>  security/Makefile                        |   1 +
>  security/hornet/Kconfig                  |  11 +
>  security/hornet/Makefile                 |   7 +
>  security/hornet/hornet.asn1              |  13 +
>  security/hornet/hornet_lsm.c             | 333 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  11 files changed, 702 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Hornet.rst
>  create mode 100644 security/hornet/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 security/hornet/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 security/hornet/hornet.asn1
>  create mode 100644 security/hornet/hornet_lsm.c

...

> +static int hornet_check_program(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
> +				struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel,
> +				enum lsm_integrity_verdict *verdict)
> +{
> +	struct hornet_maps maps = {0};
> +	bpfptr_t usig = make_bpfptr(attr->signature, is_kernel);
> +	struct pkcs7_message *msg;
> +	struct hornet_parse_context *ctx;
> +	void *sig;
> +	int err;
> +	const void *authattrs;
> +	size_t authattrs_len;
> +
> +	if (!attr->signature) {
> +		*verdict = LSM_INT_VERDICT_UNSIGNED;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hornet_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!ctx)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	maps.fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, is_kernel);
> +	sig = kzalloc(attr->signature_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!sig) {
> +		err = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	err = copy_from_bpfptr(sig, usig, attr->signature_size);
> +	if (err != 0)
> +		goto cleanup_sig;
> +
> +	msg = pkcs7_parse_message(sig, attr->signature_size);
> +	if (IS_ERR(msg)) {
> +		err = LSM_INT_VERDICT_BADSIG;
> +		goto cleanup_sig;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (verify_pkcs7_message_sig(prog->insnsi, prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn), msg,
> +				     VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> +				     VERIFYING_BPF_SIGNATURE,
> +				     NULL, NULL)) {
> +		err = LSM_INT_VERDICT_UNKNOWNKEY;
> +		goto cleanup_msg;
> +	}

Given that kernel module signatures are verified with
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING it's reasonable to do the same here in
Hornet.  I suspect most users concerned about code integrity, especially
code running in the kernel's context, will likely want to verify BPF
programs with the secondary keyring.

However, as we've seen from prior discussions, there is a desire among
some users to support arbitrary keyrings, and we should find a way to
support that in some configuration.

If we take a similar approach to bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() and take
the keyring from attr->keyring_id, LSMs that provide enforcement via the
bpf_prog_load_post_integrity callback should be able to check the
keyring_id as part of their decision making and respond accordingly.  Do
we need to worry about a malicious userspace modifying attr at this
point?  I think the answer is "no", but I didn't chase it through the
code to be sure.

I suppose there might be a need for a yama-esque LSM which only provides
a bpf_prog_load_post_integrity callback and ensures a valid signature
verified against the VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING without the need for
any other policy or tunables, but let's see what the v4 revision looks
like first.  We can always add this later if needed, and it could live
within the Hornet dir (similar to how the integrity directory hosts
both the IMA and EVM LSMs).

> +	if (pkcs7_get_authattr(msg, OID_hornet_data,
> +			       &authattrs, &authattrs_len) == -ENODATA) {
> +		err = LSM_INT_VERDICT_PARTIALSIG;
> +		goto cleanup_msg;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = asn1_ber_decoder(&hornet_decoder, ctx, authattrs, authattrs_len);
> +	if (err < 0 || authattrs == NULL) {
> +		err = LSM_INT_VERDICT_BADSIG;
> +		goto cleanup_msg;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = hornet_verify_hashes(&maps, ctx, prog);
> +
> +cleanup_msg:
> +	pkcs7_free_message(msg);
> +cleanup_sig:
> +	kfree(sig);
> +out:
> +	kfree(ctx);
> +	return err;
> +}

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