[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Feng Yang]

From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@xxxxxxxxxx>

Using the following BPF program will cause a kernel panic:
SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
int fmod_task_alloc(void *ctx)
{
        return 1;
}

[  383.899321] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b99
[  383.899327] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  383.899330] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  383.899332] PGD 8000000108a60067 P4D 8000000108a60067 PUD 104550067 PMD 0
[  383.899341] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  383.899346] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12925 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[  383.899349] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  383.899351] RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0x20/0x80
[  383.899358] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 0b 98 0a 00 85 ed 75 32 48 81 c3 98 0b 00 00 <48> 8b 1b 48 85 db 74 14 b8 01 00 00 00 f0 0f c1 03 85 c0 74 27 8d
[  383.899362] RSP: 0018:ffffd3ca0ab13b38 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  383.899367] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000b99 RCX: 0000000000000008
[  383.899371] RDX: ffff8b2c85860000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  383.899374] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000010754cf50c8 R09: 0000010754cf50c8
[  383.899377] R10: ffffffff95a6c000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 0000000000000000
[  383.899380] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000001200000
[  383.899384] FS:  00007f3eae907740(0000) GS:ffff8b2d05e5c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  383.899388] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  383.899390] CR2: 0000000000000b99 CR3: 0000000106a94003 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  383.899393] Call Trace:
[  383.899397]  <TASK>
[  383.899401]  kernel_clone+0xe8/0x480
[  383.899406]  __do_sys_clone+0x65/0x90
[  383.899410]  do_syscall_64+0xca/0x860
[  383.899421]  ? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2a0
[  383.899427]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x4c/0x90
[  383.899434]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x3b7/0x4d0
[  383.899437]  ? do_read_fault+0x107/0x210
[  383.899442]  ? do_fault+0x1b2/0x330
[  383.899445]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x49b/0x7a0
[  383.899448]  ? count_memcg_events+0xc4/0x160
[  383.899453]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xbb/0x370
[  383.899456]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x209/0x680
[  383.899459]  ? irqentry_exit+0x7a/0x660
[  383.899462]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  383.899466] RIP: 0033:0x7f3eaeb426e7
[  383.899470] Code: 5d c3 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 39 89 c2 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00
[  383.899472] RSP: 002b:00007fff23a2c838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
[  383.899477] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3eaeb426e7
[  383.899479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
[  383.899481] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  383.899483] R10: 00007f3eae907a10 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  383.899485] R13: 00007fff23a2dbe8 R14: 0000000000403de0 R15: 00007f3eaecf5000
[  383.899488]  </TASK>
[  383.899489] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry snd_intel8x0 pmt_discovery pmt_class snd_ac97_codec intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry ac97_bus intel_vsec snd_pcm snd_timer snd rapl soundcore joydev sg i2c_piix4 pcspkr vboxguest i2c_smbus nfnetlink sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic vmwgfx ahci libahci ata_piix drm_ttm_helper ghash_clmulni_intel video ttm e1000 wmi libata serio_raw dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev autofs4
[  383.899624] CR2: 0000000000000b99

This is because
1. The BPF program is designed to override the normal behavior of
`security_task_alloc` and forcibly return a non-zero error value (e.g.,
`-ENOMEM` or `1`).
2. User space triggers a process creation syscall (like `fork` or
`clone`). The kernel invokes `copy_process` to allocate and initialize a
new `task_struct` for the child process.
3. `copy_process` invokes `security_task_alloc`. Due to the attached BPF
program, it returns the positive value `1`.
4. `copy_process` treats any non-zero return from `security_task_alloc`
as a failure. It aborts initialization, cleans up, and returns the error
code cast to a pointer via `ERR_PTR(1)` (which evaluates to the memory
address `0x1`).
5. In `kernel_clone()`, the kernel uses the `IS_ERR()` macro to check if
the returned `task_struct *p` is an error pointer. However, `IS_ERR()`
only checks for negative error codes in the range `[-MAX_ERRNO, -1]`.
Since `0x1` is not in this range, the check `IS_ERR(p)` evaluates to
`false`.
6. The kernel incorrectly assumes `p` is a valid `task_struct` pointer
and proceeds to call `get_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)`. This dereferences
the invalid address `0x1` (plus the offset of the `thread_pid` field),
triggering a general protection fault or null-pointer dereference.

Therefore, for security-related functions, similar to LSM,
the validity of their return values is verified to fix the issue.
Return value validation for fault injection is also added accordingly.

Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/973a1b7b-8ee7-407a-890a-11455d9cc5bf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Signed-off-by: Feng Yang <yangfeng@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 261 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 167 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9c1135d373e2..37975e9a291c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -18391,6 +18391,167 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
+
+/* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
+ * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
+ */
+BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
+/* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
+ * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
+ */
+BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio)
+#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC
+BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
+BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
+#endif
+BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
+
+static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
+{
+	return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
+}
+
+static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
+{
+	/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are
+	 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
+	 */
+	if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
+	    within_error_injection_list(addr))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
+{
+	if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
+	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					  struct bpf_retval_range *retval_range)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux->dst_trampoline->func.addr;
+
+	if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) {
+		switch (get_injectable_error_type(addr)) {
+		case EI_ETYPE_NULL:
+			retval_range->minval = 0;
+			retval_range->maxval = 0;
+			break;
+		case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO:
+			retval_range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
+			retval_range->maxval = -1;
+			break;
+		case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL:
+			retval_range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
+			retval_range->maxval = 0;
+			break;
+		case EI_ETYPE_TRUE:
+			retval_range->minval = 1;
+			retval_range->maxval = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		retval_range->return_32bit = true;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* Unfortunately, the arch-specific prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code
+ * so we need to hard-code them, too. Ftrace has arch_syscall_match_sym_name()
+ * but that just compares two concrete function names.
+ */
+static bool has_arch_syscall_prefix(const char *func_name)
+{
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "__x64_", 6);
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "__ia32_", 7);
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "__s390x_", 8);
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "__arm64_", 8);
+#elif defined(__riscv)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "__riscv_", 8);
+#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "sys_", 4);
+#elif defined(__loongarch__)
+	return !strncmp(func_name, "sys_", 4);
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Without error injection, allow sleepable and fmod_ret progs on syscalls. */
+
+static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
+{
+	if (has_arch_syscall_prefix(func_name))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
+{
+	if (has_arch_syscall_prefix(func_name) ||
+	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* The system call return value is allowed to be an arbitrary value. */
+static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					  struct bpf_retval_range *retval_range)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */
+
+/* hooks return 0 or 1 */
+BTF_SET_START(bool_security_hooks)
+BTF_ID(func, security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)
+BTF_ID(func, security_audit_rule_known)
+BTF_ID(func, security_inode_xattr_skipcap)
+BTF_SET_END(bool_security_hooks)
+
+/* Similar to bpf_lsm_get_retval_range,
+ * ensure that the return values of fmod_ret are valid.
+ */
+static int bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					 struct bpf_retval_range *retval_range)
+{
+	if (strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
+		    sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (btf_id_set_contains(&bool_security_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id)) {
+		retval_range->minval = 0;
+		retval_range->maxval = 1;
+	} else {
+		retval_range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
+		retval_range->maxval = 0;
+	}
+	retval_range->return_32bit = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_range *range)
 {
@@ -18444,8 +18605,13 @@ static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_
 			*range = retval_range(0, 0);
 			break;
 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
-		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
 			return false;
+		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
+			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				break;
+			if (modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				return false;
+			break;
 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
 		default:
 			break;
@@ -25487,99 +25653,6 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info,
 					  st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt);
 }
-#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
-
-/* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
- * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
- */
-BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
-/* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
- * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
- */
-BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio)
-#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC
-BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
-BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
-#endif
-BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
-
-static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
-{
-	return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
-}
-
-static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
-{
-	/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are
-	 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
-	 */
-	if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
-	    within_error_injection_list(addr))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
-{
-	if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
-	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-#else
-
-/* Unfortunately, the arch-specific prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code
- * so we need to hard-code them, too. Ftrace has arch_syscall_match_sym_name()
- * but that just compares two concrete function names.
- */
-static bool has_arch_syscall_prefix(const char *func_name)
-{
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "__x64_", 6);
-#elif defined(__i386__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "__ia32_", 7);
-#elif defined(__s390x__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "__s390x_", 8);
-#elif defined(__aarch64__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "__arm64_", 8);
-#elif defined(__riscv)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "__riscv_", 8);
-#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "sys_", 4);
-#elif defined(__loongarch__)
-	return !strncmp(func_name, "sys_", 4);
-#else
-	return false;
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Without error injection, allow sleepable and fmod_ret progs on syscalls. */
-
-static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
-{
-	if (has_arch_syscall_prefix(func_name))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
-{
-	if (has_arch_syscall_prefix(func_name) ||
-	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */
 
 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 			    const struct bpf_prog *prog,
-- 
2.43.0